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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education brought student-to-student sexual harassment to the forefront of the
national conversation on gender equity in schools.' The Court's landmark ruling,
requiring schools to respond to known peer sexual harassment in their programs,
marks a new era for recognition of sexual harassment among students as a serious
educational and legal issue, and will prompt greater protection of students from
such conduct. Despite this development in the area of peer sexual harassment,
efforts to gain legal protection for students who have been harassed for being (or
perceived as being) gay or lesbian have not fared as well. Courts approach
anti-gay harassment very differently from peer sexual harassment, leaving
victims of anti-gay harassment with few options for legal recourse. 2 This article
harassexplores the inconsistencies in the treatment of peer sexual and anti-gay
IX.3
Title
on
focus
particular
a
with
law,
discrimination
sex
under
ment
Differences in the courts' treatment of anti-gay peer harassment and peer
sexual harassment become evident when comparing Davis with a recent Seventh
Circuit case, Nabozny v. Podlesny,4 brought by a former student who had been

1. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
2. In this paper, I use the terms anti-gay harassment and peer sexual harassment to denote the law's
treatment of them as distinct forms of misconduct, even though anti-gay harassment is also peer
harassment, and, I argue, like sexual harassment, a form of harassment based on sex.
3. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides in pertinent part:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (1999). Title IX applies to any public or private educational institution that receives
federal funds, with limited exceptions. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)-(9). All aspects of an educational
institution's programs and activities must comply with Title IX if any part of it receives federal funding.
20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1999). For a broader outline of the mechanics of Title IX's basic scope and
enforcement, see Arthur L. Coleman, When Hostile Hallways Become Hostile Environments: Understanding the FederalLaw that ProhibitsSexual Harassmentof Students by Students, I GEO. J. GENDER & LAW
109 (1999). While Title IX applies to all levels of education, including elementary/secondary, undergraduate, and post-graduate education, this article primarily focuses on sexual harassment and anti-gay
harassment occurring at the elementary/secondary level. However, much of the analysis and discussion
herein could also apply to the higher education context.
4. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
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subjected to prolonged and extreme harassment because he was gay. In Davis, the
challenged behavior involved a five and one-half month pattern of escalating
harassment and abuse by a male student, identified as G.F., towards a female
classmate, LaShonda Davis. 5 Both students were in the fifth grade. The harassment by G.F. included both verbal and physical sexual conduct, such as
requesting to have sex, attempting to touch LaShonda's breasts and genital area,
rubbing against LaShonda in a sexual manner and, in one instance, putting a
doorstop in his pants and acting "in a sexually suggestive manner" towards her
during physical education class.6 The behavior was persistent and unrelenting. At
one point, LaShonda told her mother that she 'didn't know how much longer she
could keep [G.F.] off her.' 7 Despite repeated complaints to teachers and the
school principal by both LaShonda and her mother, no action was taken to
discipline G.F. 8 In fact, during the first three months of the harassment, LaShonda
was denied permission even to move her seat away from G.F., who sat next to her
in class. 9 G.F.'s constant barrage of abuse had an academic and psychological
effect on LaShonda; her previously high grades of A's and B's dropped substantially, and she wrote a suicide note.' ° Exasperated by the school's lack of
response, Mrs. Davis filed criminal charges against G.F. with the county sheriff,
and G.F. ultimately pled guilty to sexual battery."' Only then did the harassment
end, after more than five months of abuse.
In addition to filing criminal charges, Mrs. Davis, as next friend of LaShonda,
also filed suit against the Monroe County Board of Education, alleging that the
Board failed to take appropriate action in response to the sexually hostile
environment created by G.F.12 The district court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss the claim as a matter of law on the ground that Title IX does not cover
sexual harassment committed by students.13 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first
held that Title IX requires schools to take corrective action once they knew or
should have known of peer sexual harassment, and then reversed itself en banc,
holding that Title IX does not apply to peer sexual harassment under any
circumstances. 14
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit en
banc decision and remanded the case to the district court. 15 Under the Supreme
Court's ruling, Title IX supports an action for damages where a school responds
with deliberate indifference to peer sexual harassment once it has actual notice of
5. 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1999).
6. Id.at 1667.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.at 1667-68.
13. 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
14. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996), reversed en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (1 th Cir. 1997).
15. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
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the harassment.' 6 As long as the underlying sexual harassment is "so severe,
pervasive and objecuvely offensive that it denies its victims the equal acccss to
education that Title IX is designed to protect," the school is accountable for its
response (or lack thereof). 17 The plaintiff must prove that the school acted with
deliberate indifference, but need not demonstrate that the school treated the
harassment complaints of students differently based on the sex of the complainant, or acted out of an impermissible discriminatory motive toward persons of
one sex.
In Nabozny v. Podlesny, the Seventh Circuit took a very different approach
toward anti-gay peer harassment in schools, although it also permitted the
plaintiff to proceed with his claim in the face of a motion to dismiss. 18 In this
case, Jamie Nabozny, who realized that he was gay in the seventh grade and did
not try to hide his sexual orientation from his peers, was subjected to extreme
verbal and physical harassment by his fellow students. 9 The harassment continued throughout middle school and high school, and included a "mock rape" by
two boys in front of twenty onlookers, an assault in the bathroom during which
Jamie was pushed into a urinal and urinated on, and an aggravated assault by
eight boys in a hallway, which, weeks later, caused Jamie to collapse from
internal bleeding. 20 The school's response to these actions was consistent, and
unfortunately, not atypical: "boys will be boys" and students who identify as gay
should "expect" such abuse. 2 ' One school official went so far as to tell Jamie, a
few weeks before he collapsed from the final assault, that he "deserved such
treatment because he is gay."' 22 After two suicide attempts and numerous
unsuccessful efforts to enlist help from school officials, Jamie left school in the
16. Id. at 1666.
17. Id. at 1675.
18. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996). Because the plaintiff in Nabozny succeeded in
his claim, it is arguably not the best case to show the full scope of the disparity in the law's treatment of
peer sexual and anti-gay harassment, particularly since similar arguments by students challenging
anti-gay harassment have not fared so well. See, e.g., Doe v. Riverside Brookfield Township, No. 95
C-2437, 1995 WL 680749 (N.D. 111.Nov. 14, 1995) (rejecting equal protection claim based on school's
failure to respond to anti-gay peer harassment where plaintiff failed to show that the school treated
harassment victims differently, as opposed to having a low level of discipline generally). I have chosen to
highlight the Nabozny case, however, both because it is the first, and to date only, circuit court decision to
address anti-gay peer harassment in school under a sex discrimination analysis, and because it
demonstrates that even a "win" in such a case under existing law leaves much to be desired.
19. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451.
20. Id. at 452.
21. Id. at 451. Cf. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d 776, 777 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing school
officials' response to female students' complaints of sexual harassment by male students as "boys will be
boys"); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 68, 75 (D.N.H. 1997) (describing superintendent's statement that verbal and physical sexual harassment of female student by male students was
"normal behavior for kids her age"); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F Supp. 1560, 1565 (1993)
(describing school official who responded to sexual harassment complaints of female students with "boys
will be boys"); Doe v. University of II1., 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing school officials'
suggestion that plaintiff herself was to blame for sexual harassment by male students, and one official's
statement that she and her friends should start acting like "normal females" and stop making accusations
that could injure the male students' futures).
22. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 452.
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eleventh grade.23 Jamie sued the school district under Section 1983 for violating
his equal protection rights.24

As in Davis, the district court ruled for the school district on the ground that
Jamie could not prove that the school district discriminated against him because
of his sex. 25 The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Jamie had produced
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that a female student
who had been subjected to the same harassment would have been treated more
favorably.26 In support of such an inference, the court cited the school district's
admitted policy and practice of "aggressively punish[ing] male-on-female battery and harassment. '' 27 Accordingly, the court found it "impossible to believe
that a female lodging a similar complaint would have received the same
response." ' 28 The court's approach, while disagreeing with the district court's
conclusion, nevertheless requires victims of anti-gay harassment to prove that the
school ignored the harassment because of their sex.2 9
While Jamie Nabozny succeeded under a sex discrimination theory at this
pre-trial stage of the litigation, the court's approach makes it far more difficult for
plaintiffs to succeed with an anti-gay peer harassment claim than with a peer
sexual harassment claim such as the one argued in Davis. If the school in fact
ignored the complaints of all gay students, male and female alike, or had a
sketchy record of responding to sexual harassment complaints generally, a
plaintiff would be unsuccessful under the Nabozny holding. Thus, under the
Nabozny rationale, a school can insulate itself from liability for sex discrimination by treating male and female harassment complainants uniformly, however
inadequately it responds to the underlying harassment.
The different approaches taken by these two cases reflect differences in how
the Davis and Nabozny courts interpreted the based-on-sex requirement of Title
IX.In Davis, the Court assumed that the harasser treated the plaintiff differently

23. Id. at 451-52.
24. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights by officials acting under
color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999). For an explanation of how Section 1983 applies to schools in
sexual harassment cases, see DEBORAH BRAKE & VERNA WILLIAMS, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER,
RIGHTING THE WRONGS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING, ADDRESSING AND PREVENTING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS 48-49 (1998). Although Nabozny involved a sex discrimination claim brought

under the Equal Protection Clause and not Title IX, the Court's analysis is equally applicable to a Title IX
claim for damages, because both causes of action require the plaintiff to demonstrate intentional
discrimination on the basis of sex. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring
plaintiff to prove that the school intentionally discriminated based on sex); Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (upholding a private damages action for intentional discrimination
under Title IX).
25. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F. 3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996).
26. Id. at 454-55.
27. Id. at 455. Interestingly, the court never used the term "sexual harassment" to describe the
underlying conduct, and instead used gender-neutral terms such as "harassment," "physical abuse,"
"assault," and "battery," despite the sexual nature of the harassment involved in the case. Id. at 449,
451-52.
28. Id. at 454-55.
29. Id. at 453-54.
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because of her sex, and that the school was liable for damages because it was
deliberateiy indifferent to that harassment. Thus, in Davis, the based-on-sex
element was located at the level of the underlying harassment. In Nabozny,
however, the plaintiff had to do more than demonstrate that the school responded
with deliberate indifference to the harassment in order to succeed on his equal
protection claim; he had to show that the school itself treated him differently
because he was male. Unlike Davis, Nabozny located the sex-based element of
the discrimination at the level of the school's conduct.
These different approaches stem from the law's different treatment of sexual
harassment and harassment that is perceived to be based on sexual orientation.
Long before Davis, at least in male-female sexual harassment cases, courts have
assumed that the harasser's conduct toward the victim was based on her sex.3 °
The debate over peer sexual harassment has largely centered on the issue of
whether the school discriminates based on sex when it ignores sexual harassment
by students, not whether the harassment itself was based on sex. In the case of
anti-gay harassment, by contrast, the harassment is regarded as based on sexual
orientation and not sex. As a result, sex discrimination law has been interpreted to
provide a remedy for anti-gay harassment only where the school itself treated
harassed students differently on the basis of sex.
This article questions the courts' differing treatment of peer anti-gay harassment and peer sexual harassment under Title IX. By more fully elaborating the
theory for why peer sexual harassment generally discriminates based on sex, it
seeks to ground school indifference to anti-gay harassment as a sex-based wrong
as well. Both anti-gay harassment and peer sexual harassment discriminate
against students on the basis of sex. Once the underlying harassment is recognized as sex-based, the school is liable for effectively condoning the harassment;
the school itself need not treat harassment victims differently based on sex to
violate sex discrimination law.
The article first explores why school inaction in the face of sexual harassment
discriminates on the basis of sex. Although sex discrimination law has recognized
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination for over two decades,31 there
has been little analysis of why an institution that fails to sufficiently remedy
sexual harassment itself violates anti-discrimination principles. In keeping with
this historic reticence, although Davis clearly held that school indifference is
sufficient to establish discrimination under Title IX, it did not fully explain how a
school's inaction (or insufficient action) discriminates against students based on
sex. The clear implication of Davis is that a school discriminates when it
exacerbates or encourages sex discrimination by others. The lesson of Davisthat a school essentially participates in the harassment when it responds with
deliberate indifference-is equally applicable to anti-gay harassment.

30. See infra Part l A.
31. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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The article then more fully elaborates on the law's different treatment of
anti-gay and peer sexual harassment in schools. The two types of harassment are
treated differently because harassment that targets gay and lesbian students is
viewed as being based on sexual orientation and not based on sex. Even the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 32-which takes a somewhat broader view of
harassment of gay and lesbian students than courts have to date-regards such
harassment as based on sex only when it is overtly sexual in nature. The current
legal approach to anti-gay peer harassment in schools is inadequate to provide
meaningful relief to the victims of such conduct and inconsistent with the law's
treatment of peer sexual harassment generally.
The next part of the article examines four alternative theories that courts have
suggested or implied for grounding peer sexual harassment as a harm that is
based on sex: (1) that the harasser is attracted to the target, who would not have
been selected but for her sex; (2) that overtly sexual harassment is necessarily
based on the sex of the persons harmed; (3) that the sexual harassment more
frequently, or more severely, harms girls and women, and thus has a disparate
impact based on sex; and (4) that the harasser acted out of a sex-discriminatory
motive. This article concludes that each of these theories is incomplete and
inadequate as an explanation for why peer sexual harassment generally, and
anti-gay harassment in particular, is based on sex.
Finally, this article proposes grounding sexual harassment as based on sex
because it polices gender roles and boundaries according to sex stereotypes. As
argued by several scholars, much sexual harassment fits under the rubric of
gender policing: both in punishing gender "outliers," including students perceived as gay or lesbian, and in reinforcing stereotyped roles of females as sexual
objects and males as sexual aggressors.3 3 Adding this theory to the existing
arsenal of possibilities for explaining why peer harassment is sex discrimination
under Title IX provides a more complete picture of how peer sexual harassment
harms students based on their sex, while at the same time reaching anti-gay
harassment under a more satisfactory theory.
I. TITLE IX's TREATMENT OF PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
WHY DOES SCHOOL INACTION DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF SEX?
The controversy over whether Title IX requires schools to take sufficient action
in response to peer sexual harassment was recently settled by the Supreme

Court's decision in Davis. The Davis Court held that a school's deliberate
32. The Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the U.S. Department of Education is the primary federal
agency responsible for enforcing Title IX against education programs and activities that receive federal
funds. Its interpretations of Title IX are generally afforded deference by courts. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th
Cir. 1993). For a more complete explanation of OCR's enforcement responsibilities and its method of
enforcing Title IX,see Coleman, supra note 3, at 120-22.
33. See infra Part IV A & B.
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indifference to peer sexual harassment, once it has actual notice of the harassment, supports a private cause of action for damages under Title IX. 4 Prior to
Davis, lower courts had struggled with the question of whether, and in what
respect, a school's failure to remedy sexual harassment discriminates on the basis
of sex. These pre-Davis decisions adopted one or more of three different lines of
reasoning to explain the relationship between harassment by students and the
school's own misconduct. Some courts viewed the harm as caused by students,
for whom schools could not be held legally responsible under any circumstances. 35 Others viewed schools as acting in a sex-neutral fashion if they ignored
sexual harassment complaints brought by all students, regardless of sex. 3 6 Still
others required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the school's inadequate response
stemmed from an intent to discriminate against harassment victims based on their
sex. 37 Davis implicitly rejected each of these approaches, and adopted its own
interpretation of why a school discriminates on the basis of sex when it chooses to
ignore peer sexual harassment. Examining the different interpretations of discrimination adopted by lower courts, and Davis' response to them, provides a clearer
understanding of the full meaning of Davis' interpretation of what it means to
discriminate, and in what sense peer sexual harassment cases involve discrimination on the basis of sex.
A.

BEFORE DAVIs V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION:

THE

LOWER COURTS' APPROACHES TO DISCRIMINATION

As stated above, one approach taken by lower courts prior to Davis held that
because the school or its agents did not sexually harass the plaintiff, the school
could not be held liable for the discriminatory actions of students. 38 They
reasoned that since the actual perpetrator was a student who did not act as an
agent of, or with the authority of, the school, holding schools responsible for
failing to remedy peer sexual harassment would be tantamount to holding schools
responsible for the actions of third parties. The analysis employed by these lower
courts parallels the approach taken by some courts to the state action doctrine,
34. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
35. See, e.g., infra notes 38-41.
36. See, e.g., infra notes 42-44.
37. See, e.g., infra notes 45, 47-48.
38. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(characterizing the claim as "seeking direct liability of the Board for the wrongdoing of a student"); id. at
1400 n.13 (arguing for a different result in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases than under Title VII
because "students are not agents of the school board"); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d
1006, 1010 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996) (asking "whether the recipient of federal education funds can be found
liable for sex discrimination when the perpetrator is a party other than the grant recipient or its agents,"
and answering in the negative) (citations omitted); Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp.
1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing Title IX peer harassment claim because harasser was a student and not
a school employee); Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994)
(dismissing Title IX peer sexual harassment claim because sexual harassment by students "is not part of a
school program or activity," and plaintiff did not allege that the school board itself or any employee "had
any role in the harassment").
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which seeks to determine whether the challenged conduct was the work of a state
or private actor. 39 Lawsuits seeking to hold the state accountable for wrongdoing
perpetrated by arguably private actors are often analyzed under the rubric of state
action. 40 Rather than directly examining the constitutionality of what the state has
done, the focus is on whether the connection between the state and allegedly private
party is sufficient to render the wrongful conduct "state action."'' a Likewise, those
pre-Davis courts that rejected peer sexual harassment claims on the basis that students,
not the school, committed the harassment, found dispositive the lack of an agency
connection between the school and the student harasser, thus foreclosing any meaningful inquiry into whether the school itself violated Title IX.
A second rationale in pre-Davis decisions for rejecting peer sexual harassment
claims viewed the school's reaction to sexual harassment complaints as sexneutral and in compliance with Title IX, so long as the school itself did not treat
harassment victims differently based on their sex.4 2 This approach reflects an
exceptionally narrow view of discrimination: even if the student-harasser harmed
his target on the basis of sex, as long as the school acted neutrally with respect to
the sex of harassment victims, it did not violate Title IX. The most prominent
example of this type of reasoning is found in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent
39. The "state action requirement" refers to the generally accepted principle that the Constitution, for
the most part, only prohibits deprivations of individual rights caused by state actors. See, e.g., The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
invading individual rights); Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195
(1989) (stating that the Due Process Clause prohibits States, not private actors, from depriving
individuals of liberties without due process of law); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL
LAW 350, 1688 (2d ed. 1988) (recognizing that a majority of the Constitution's protections of individual
rights guard individuals only from government action).
40. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (finding that individual transfer decisions
of state-subsidized nursing home are not "state action"); Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 201 (1988) (holding the
state not responsible for actions of abusive father because the father, not the state, inflicted the harm);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1960) (upholding suit against state agency and
private restaurant after finding state action in the "interdependence" and "joint participa[tion]" in the
challenged activity); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (finding state enforcement of private racially
restrictive covenants to be state action under the Equal Protection Clause, so that such enforcement must
be enjoined). These cases involved efforts to hold the states accountable for actions immediately carried
out by private actors; they are thus different from lawsuits brought against private actors asserting that the
state's imprimatur rendered them state actors. See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003.
41. As discussed below, the state action doctrine has often been criticized as a device to disguise
determinations that actually go to the merits of constitutional principles. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 507-08 (5th ed. 1995) ("Under traditional theory a holding
that no state action is present is a separate ruling from a decision on the constitutionality of the challenged
practice, but the consequence of such a ruling is the continuation of the challenged practice ...Despite
traditional doctrine, it can readily be seen that a ruling on the presence of state action is a decision on the
merits of the underlying constitutional claim.").
42. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Seamons v.
Snow, 84 E3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing male student's claim that school created a hostile
environment by failing to respond adequately to sexually charged locker room attack by other male
students because plaintiff failed to allege that the school treated him differently based on sex); Piwonka v.
Tidehaven Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (following Rowinsky and dismissing
plaintiff's claim because she failed to allege that the school district treats male and female sexual
harassment victims differently).
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School District,in which the Fifth Circuit held that a school does not discriminate
on the basis of sex when it ignores a female student's complaint of peer sexual
harassment unless she can establish that the school treated male harassment
victims more favorably. 43 Rowinsky thus requires plaintiffs to prove by comparative evidence that they were treated differently than a similarly-situated group on
the basis of a prohibited criteria. If the school treats all sexual harassment victims
alike, or if there is no comparison group of similarly situated persons because, for
example, only female students have complained of sexual harassment, a victim of
sexual harassment has no recourse under this approach.44
A third and somewhat more plaintiff-friendly approach taken by many preDavis courts rejected Rowinsky's requirement of comparative evidence, but
nevertheless interpreted discrimination in this context to require that the school
intended to discriminate against the plaintiff because of her sex.45 While these lower
courts disavowed the Rowinsky ruling as overly restrictive, and permitted peer sexual
harassment claims to proceed based on the school's failure to respond to the harassment, they nevertheless shared an important feature with the Rowinsky approach: they
too required the plaintiff to demonstrate that the school itself discriminated against
harassment victims on the basis of sex.46 Thus, even if the harasser's conduct was based
on sex and the school failed to respond despite some degree of notice of the
harassment,47 the plaintiff still had to prove that the school's insufficient response
stemmed from an intent to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of sex.
However, unlike Rowinsky, these courts permitted discriminatory intent to be
inferred from the school's knowing inaction in the face of the harassment.

43. 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996). The Rowinsky formulation of sex neutrality does not find that
the school acts neutrally when it fails to address the harassment merely because the challenge involves
the school's failure to act rather than an affirmative act. A failure to act, where such failure imposes
disadvantages on the basis of sex, violates the anti-discrimination principle just as much as positive
action. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (concluding that a state's selective denial of
protective services to disfavored minorities violates Equal Protection Clause). Instead, Rowinsky
grounded its view of school neutrality on the school's symmetrical treatment of male and female
complainants,
44. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016 (placing the burden of proving different treatment on the female
plaintiff, and assuming that complaints by male students would have been treated similarly, despite a lack
of evidence that males had complained, or that such complaints had been treated similarly).
45. See, e.g., Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(stating that plaintiff must show that "the school district selected a particular course of action in
responding to her complaints of sexual harassment at least in part 'because of her sex'); Franks v.
Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 748 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that plaintiff must show
school intended to discriminate against her because of her sex, but such intent may be inferred from the
school's inadequate response where it knew or should have known of the harassment).
46. See infra note 48.
47. Prior to Davis, the courts were split on the issue of whether to require actual, as opposed to
constructive, notice. Compare Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 1996)
(adopting knew of should have known standard), reversed en banc 120 F.3d 1390 (1997); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 132 F3d 949, 960 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Doe v. Petaluma
4
City Sch. Dist., 949 F Supp.1 15, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same), with Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d
653, 661 (7th Cir. 1998) (requiring actual notice); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 E3d
749, 754 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).

1999]

THE GENDER POLICE

While some of these courts, based on the specific facts of the case, refused to
find that the school intended to discriminate based only on the school's knowing
failure to respond to the harassment, 4 8 other courts were more generous in
inferring an intent to discriminate. One of the most generous in this regard, the
Seventh Circuit, went so far as to insist that a discriminatory motive necessarily
animated a school's poor response to sexual harassment once it had actual notice
of the harassment. In Doe v. University of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit stated that
a school's refusal to take prompt and appropriate action in response to known
sexual harassment "is presumably, perhaps even necessarily, a manifestation of
intentional sex discrimination.", 49 After all, the court stated, "what other good
reason could there possibly be for refusing even to make meaningful investigation of such complaints?", 50 Yet, while more generous in the level of proof
required, even the most favorable of these decisions shared Rowinsky's premise
that the school itself must intend to treat harassment victims differently because
of their sex, and grounded the sex-based wrong of peer sexual harassment in the
school's intent to discriminate, rather than on the school's response to the
underlying discrimination by students. 5 l
B. THE MEANING OF DISCRIMINATION IN DAVIS: DID THE SCHOOL "CAUSE"
THE DISCRIMINATION?

The Davis Court took an approach entirely different from each of those
discussed above. The Court rejected the lower court approach that held schools
48. See, e.g., Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d 776, 781 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming district
court ruling setting aside jury verdict for plaintiff because evidence did not support an inference that the
school district's actions in response to plaintiff's sexual harassment complaints "were impermissibly
motivated by [her] sex"); Linson v. Trustees of Univ. of Penn., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122243, at *11
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996) (holding that plaintiff must show that the school's "inaction (or insufficient
action) in the face of complaints of student-to-student sexual harassment was a result of an actual intent to
discriminate against the student on the basis of sex," and dismissing Title IX claim because plaintiff
failed to establish that university's inaction was "gender-motivated"); Wright v. Mason City Community
Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419-1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (assuming that the alleged peer sexual
harassment was based on sex, but granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and setting
aside jury verdict for plaintiff because plaintiff failed to prove that school district intentionally
discriminated against her on the basis of sex when it failed to adequately respond to the harassment).
49. 138 F.3d 653, 663 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 E Supp. 1415,
1424 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that school that knew or should have known of peer sexual harassment,
yet failed to take appropriate responsive action, is necessarily liable for intentional discrimination under
Title IX).
50. Doe, 138 F.3d at 663. In equating the absence of a "good reason" for school inaction with an intent
to discriminate, the court went well beyond what discrimination law generally recognizes as intentional
discrimination. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (holding that proof that
employer's asserted reason for negative employment action was merely a "pretext" may be insufficient
to prove that the action was motivated by racial animus); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 277 (1979) (finding that a policy disproportionately harming women must have been adopted
because of, not despite, its harmful effect on women to constitute intentional discrimination under equal
protection clause). Under these precedents, the reason for a school's failure to remedy peer sexual
harassment could be less than "good" (i.e., overloaded administrators who accept a low level of
discipline generally), and yet not rise to the level of an intent to discriminate against girls or women.
51. See supra notes 45 & 48.
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unaccountable because students do not act as the school's agents, the Rowinsky
formulation of school neutrality that simply requires schools to treat male and
female harassment victims alike, and the somewhat more plaintiff-friendly
approach that permits peer harassment claims to go forward but requires
plaintiffs to establish that the school acted (or failed to act) based on an intent to
discriminate against the plaintiff. In doing so, the Davis Court shed new light on
the nature of peer sexual harassment as a species of sex discrimination in several
important respects.
By refusing to immunize schools for their actions in response to sexual
harassment by non-agents, Davis declined to import into Title IX a school-action
equivalent of a state action analysis.5 2 Unlike many of the lower courts that
rejected peer harassment claims, the Davis Court refused to halt the Title IX
analysis once it acknowledged that the harassing student did not act on behalf of
the school. Instead, the Court proceeded to analyze on the merits whether the
school's own misconduct in failing to stop the known harassment violated Title
IX.3 The Davis Court thus recognized that even if the harassment was done by
students, who are not agents of the school, the school "acted" in its response (or
non-response) to the harassment. It is this school action (or failure to act),
considered in light of the school's control over the educational environment, that
the Court examined in analyzing whether the school violated Title IX.
52. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1671-73 (1999). One threshold obstacle to
importing a state action-type doctrine into Title IX is the statutory language itself. Unlike the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that "no state shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," Title IX does not limit its prohibition to the
actions of any particular actor, and focuses instead on the class of persons protected. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(1999). Nevertheless, the Court did read Title [X's prohibition on sex discrimination to apply only to
recipients of federal funds, and required that recipients themselves violate Title IX in order to support an
action for damages. As explained below, however, the Court did not allow the requirement that the
recipient itself discriminate to obscure its inquiry into whether the school's response to private
discrimination by students violated Title IX.
53. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670-71. This approach accords with the position taken by commentators that
the state action doctrine should not be used as a device to insulate states from scrutiny for the actions (or
inactions) that they have undertaken, or to disguise the court's substantive interpretation of constitutional
principles. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action, "Equal Protection,and California's
Proposition14, 81 HARv.L. REv. 69, 109 (1967) (urging less attention to the precise relationship between
the state and private actors and more attention to the content of equal protection); Harold W. Horowitz,
The Misleading Searchfor "State Action" Under the FourteenthAmendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208,
208-09 (1957) ("It is the thesis of this paper that in all of these problems there is state action, and that the
sole issue, which tends to become obscured in the search for state action, is whether the particular state
action in the particular circumstances ...is constitutional") (emphasis in original); William W. Van
Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 7 (1961) ("[W]hile the search for a merely
formal connection-for "state action"-is misleading, the search for the values which stand behind the
state action limitation is indispensable."); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and
Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 53, 86 ("Whatever state of mind is needed to establish a
"depriv[ation]" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and whatever the role of state remedies,
the supposed distinction between state action and state inaction should play no role."); Robert J.
Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A FunctionalAnalysis of the Fourteenth Amendment 'State Action'
Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221, 228-30 (arguing that the state action issue is really a determination
on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim).
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Turning to the school's own actions in the face of student harassment, the
Davis Court agreed with the Monroe County Board of Education and the court
below that the school itself must discriminate on the basis of sex in order to
support a damages action for peer sexual harassment under Title IX.54 To analyze
whether the school discriminated based on sex, the Court first analyzed the
meaning of "discrimination." ' 55 In doing so, the Court settled upon a principle of
discrimination law that is significantly broader than both the Rowinsky neutrality
approach and the alternative approach that required proof of intentional discrimination by the school, but allowed suchintent to be inferred from the school's
notice and failure to respond. Starting with the statutory language of Title IX, the
Court framed the question in terms of whether a school that decides to ignore peer
sexual harassment 'subject[s] [persons] to discrimination under' its 'programs
or activities.' ' 56 The Court ruled that a school subjects students to discrimination
when it is deliberately indifferent to peer sexual harassment that "take[s] place in
a context subject to the school district's control," and where the school has
authority to take remedial action.5 7
The requirement that a school act knowingly and with deliberate indifference
before it may be liable for damages stems from the Court's treatment of Title IX
"as legislation enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under the Spending
Clause." ' 58 Under the Court's Spending Clause precedent, recipients of federal
funds must have sufficient notice "that they could be liable for the conduct at
issue," before they may be held liable for damages under Spending Clause
statutes.59 The Davis Court held that this notice requirement is satisfied where the

54. The Court found this requirement applicable to both government enforcement actions and private
actions, because of the statute's focus on the actions of recipients of federal funds. See Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1670 (1999). However, while the requirement that the school itself
discriminate applies to private lawsuits for injunctive relief and government enforcement actions, as well
as to private actions for damages, the Court's deliberate indifference standard applies only to private
actions for damages, as discussed below. See infra notes 57-59.
55. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1670-75 (1999).
56. Id. at 1670 (quoting Title IX).
57. Id. at 1672. Davis, like Gebser before it, did not address the standard for finding schools liable for
peer harassment in OCR administrative proceedings or in private actions for injunctive relief, limiting its
analysis to private actions for damages. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1669; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998) (adopting actual notice and deliberate indifference standard in Title IX
damages actions for teacher-student harassment). See also News Release, Statement by U.S. Secretary of
Education Richard Riley: On the Impact on Title IX of the U.S. Supreme Court's Gebser v. Lago Vista
Decision (July 1, 1998) <http:www.ed.gov/PressReleases/07-1998Alago.html> ("when a ... school
teacher abuses the authority given to him or her by the school district and engages in sexual conduct with
his or her students," there is a Title IX violation, regardless of whether school officials had notice of the
conduct, and OCR may remedy such a violation through its administrative enforcement process).
58. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1669. The requirement that federal funds recipients have notice that they could
be liable before subjecting them to damages liability stems from the Court's view of Spending Clause
legislation as contractual by nature: the recipient accepts the funds in exchange for agreeing to comply
with certain obligations. Because the recipient could choose to decline the funds, under this line of
reasoning, it should have sufficient notice of its obligations before it is held liable in damages. See id.
59. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670. The Court has often been unclear about what type of notice suffices
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recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment in its programs or
activities. 60 The Court thus concluded that schools may be liable in damages "['r
'subjecting' their students to discrimination where the recipient is deliberately
indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the
harasser is under the school's disciplinary authority.,6
The Court's decision that a school discriminates on the basis of sex when it
knowingly decides "to remain idle in the face of known student-on-student
harassment,", 6 2 leaves no room for the approach taken by Rowinsky and other
courts that permitted schools to ignore sexual harassment complaints by all
students, as long as they treated males and females symmetrically. The Davis
decision does not permit an institution to balance out the sexual harassment of
one group of students by permitting sexual harassment of a comparable group.
The Court's rejection of mere symmetry as sufficient for Title IX compliance
has strong support in anti-discrimination law generally. Discrimination law as it
has developed in other contexts rejects the premise that imposing symmetrical
disadvantages on the basis of a prohibited criteria is acting neutrally with respect
to that criteria. Although the courts have viewed such symmetrical treatment as
formally equal and non-discriminatory in the past, 63 this approach has long been
discredited. 64
More recently, in the area of sexual harassment, courts have begun to
recognize that treating male and female harassment victims the same in all
respects may be inconsistent with the non-discrimination principle. 65 Symmetrito support a damages action under a spending clause statute. Compare Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992) (finding no notice problem where the recipient engages in intentional
discrimination), with Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,24-25 (1981) (stating that
recipients must have notice of their potential liability and the specific obligations imposed by the statute),
and Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998) (finding that notice is not a problem
where recipient knowingly engages in conduct that violates the statute). Davis takes an approach similar
to that taken in Gebser, holding that the notice requirement is met where the recipient intends to engage in
conduct that violates the statute. Under this standard, a school that deliberately chooses not to respond (or
to respond inadequately) to known sexual harassment has sufficient notice to be liable in damages under
Title IX. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
60. Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1671.
61. Id. at 1673.
62. Id. at 1670.
63. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that racial segregation of white and
African American passengers treated members of both races equally because both races were subjected to
the same system of racial segregation).
64. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (overruling the doctrine of "separate but
equal" in the context of public school segregation); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down
anti-miscegenation law even though prohibition on interracial marriage applied to blacks and whites
alike). Cf Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 441 (1982) (holding that discrimination against individuals
is not balanced out by an equal group-based "bottomline"). See also Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment
on the Basis of Sexual Orientation:A Claim of Sex DiscriminationUnder Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1,4 n.24
(citing cases holding that employer sanctions against whites and blacks for interracial associations
violated Title VII).
65. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting reasonable woman
standard in Title VII sexual harassment case); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (same). See also Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment.A
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cal standards in sexual harassment cases, for example, may exacerbate sex
differences in the perspectives of harassment victims. 66 Indeed, treating people
identically when they are not similarly situated often more effectively disadvantages one group than if they had been singled out for different treatment.67
Consequently, some courts have employed an asymmetrical standard to assess
the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment in a manner that is tailored to the
victim's circumstances, including the victim's sex.68
The Davis Court also concluded, albeit in a different context, that antidiscrimination law requires more than the symmetrical treatment of male and
female students. Thus, if a school's deliberate indifference to peer sexual
harassment of female students discriminates on the basis of sex-and the Court in
Davis found that it does-the school's discrimination may not be "neutralized"
by opening the net wider and disregarding the sexual harassment of boys as
well. 69 Likewise, if a school ignored complainants of racial harassment across the
board, it would not act neutrally with respect to race just because it treated all
students subjected to racial harassment the same.7 °
In addition to rejecting the Rowinsky neutrality formulation, the interpretation
of discrimination adopted by the Davis court also surpassed that of those lower
courts requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the school's inadequate response
stemmed from an intent to discriminate. Although the Davis Court required the
school itself to discriminate in order to be held liable for damages under Title

Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 106-17 (1993) [hereinafter Writing About Sexual
Harassment](discussing the Ellison and Robinson cases).
66. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 59-62 (1989) (discussing the "reasonable person" standard as a non-neutral
male standard that excludes women's perspectives on sexual harassment); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist
Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J.
1177, 1207-08 (1990) (discussing gender differences in perceptions of sexual harassment); Kathryn
Abrams, Gender Discriminationand the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183,
1203 (1989) [hereinafter Gender Discrimination] (discussing characteristically male view of sexual
harassment as relatively "harmless amusement").
67. Discrimination law has not always reached such situations. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (holding that denial of disability benefits to pregnant persons does not discriminate based on
sex). However, it has recognized some limits to the principle that equality demands only symmetrical
treatment, and thus, as explained above, a state may not bar both whites and blacks from marrying, and a
school may not permit both males and females to be harassed because of their sex.
68. See Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual
and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 108 (1992) [hereinafter Feminist
Constructions of Objectivity] (arguing that some courts' acceptance of a reasonable woman standard
reflects the recognition that "asymmetric" treatment may be required for substantive equality). While the
Supreme Court has not adopted a "reasonable woman" standard, it has agreed that an assessment of the
severity and pervasiveness of the harassment must take into account the particular circumstances of the
harassment victim. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (stating that
"the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances').
69. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1672 (1999).
70. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
peer racial harassment claim for damages under Title VI).
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IX, 7 '

it defined "discrimination" broadly to include a school's deliberate indifference to discri ii Iati i by students. A s hUCoua
..
.l.l,,, , in order for ..
l's
deliberate indifference to sexual harassment to "subject[]" students to discrimination, it "must, at a minimum, 'cause
[students] to undergo' harassment or
'make them liable or vulnerable' to it."' 72
Under the Court's approach, the school need not have desired or intended to
discriminate against harassment victims on the basis of sex; rather, by knowingly
deciding to ignore sexual harassment by students, the school "effectively
'caused' the discrimination." ' 73 In cases where the school has substantial control
over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurs, the Court
concluded, the school's deliberate indifference to the harassment may "be said to
'expose' its students to harassment or 'cause' them to undergo it 'under' " school
programs.7 4 Although the dissent in Davis took issue with the majority's
definition of discrimination, charging that it equated passive inaction in the face
of discrimination with discrimination itself,75 the majority's analysis rejected the
dissent's dichotomy between passively condoning private discrimination and
active discrimination, as well as the approach taken by those lower courts that
had required the plaintiff to demonstrate discriminatory intent on the part of the
school.7 6

The Davis Court's explanation of how and in what sense the school discriminates in such cases is significant for two reasons. First, in refusing to require
proof that the school intended to discriminate against harassment victims, the
Court rejects a motive-centered inquiry in favor of one focused on causation.
Second, by ruling that school inaction "causes" the discrimination, the Court
adopts a remarkably broad reading of causation.
71. Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1670.
72. Id. at 1672 (quoting dictionary definitions that define the word "subject" as: 'to cause to undergo
the action of something specified; expose' or 'to make liable or vulnerable; lay open; expose' and 'to
cause to undergo or submit to: make submit to a particular action or effect: EXPOSE') (emphasis in
original). The Court did not appear to interpret the terms 'subjecting' students to discrimination"
differently from "discrimination" itself; thus, the Court's reasoning appears to define the concept of
discrimination as much as it defines the concept of "subjecting" someone to discrimination. See id. at
1671.
73. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671. See also Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 679-80 (Posner, J.,
concurring) (advocating a standard that would hold a school liable under Title IX if it decides consciously
and deliberately to remain passive in the face of peer sexual harassment, "although it does not base this
decision on an invidious ground such as race or sex"); Carroll K. v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19 F
Supp. 2d 618, 621-22 (D. W. Va. 1998) (applying Gebser standard to peer sexual harassment claim,
rejecting Defendant's argument that plaintiff had to prove that the school district intended to discriminate
against her, and finding plaintiff's allegation that school responded with deliberate indifference to peer
harassment sufficient under Title IX).
74. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1672. Cf.CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 57 (1979) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN] ("Equally apparent to most
sexually harassed women is that employers could rectify their situation but instead wink at it, which
means that they let it happen. To the victims, employer liability comes down to holding responsible for
women's situation the people with the power over it.").
75. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1678-79.
76. Davis, 119 S.Ct. at 1673.
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The first of these, the Court's shift to a focus on causation, is arguably overdue.
The statute itself uses the language of causation, not intent. 7 The Court first
introduced a requirement of intentional discrimination into the Title IX framework in 1992 when it decided Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,
holding that damages are available under Title IX for intentional discrimination.78 Since Franklin, lower courts have struggled mightily to determine
intended to discriminate in actions seeking damages under
whether 7 schools
9
IX.
Title
Intentional discrimination is a prominent feature in other areas of discrimina80
tion law, including Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Yet, as several
commentators have argued, the search for intentional discrimination should
really be a search for causation: whether persons have been subjected to harm
because of their sex. 8t The search for causation, in the form of a sex-based harm,
may well diverge from an inquiry into whether the actor acted with a discriminatory intent or motive. By refocusing the inquiry as one of causation and not
merely motive or animus, the Court returned to the true meaning of anti-

77. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1999) (stating that "[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex ... be
subjected to discrimination"). I am indebted to Martha Chamallas for this insight.
78. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). Although Franklin did not specifically foreclose a damages remedy for
unintentional discrimination, lower courts so interpreted it. See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ.,
912 F. Supp. 892, 918 (M.D. La. 1996) ("[Ijn line with the Pennhurst and Guardians result, this Court
finds that monetary damages are not recoverable under Title IX absent a finding of intentional
discrimination"); cases cited supra note 48. After Davis and Gebser, it is highly unlikely that Title IX
provides a damages remedy for unintentional discrimination. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671 (characterizing Gebser as ruling that "the district could be liable for damages only where the district itself
intentionally acted in clear violation of Title IX"); see also Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463
U.S. 582, 597-98 (1983) (White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (holding damages not
available under Title VI for unintentional, or disparate impact, discrimination). It remains unclear
whether Title IX reaches disparate impact discrimination (even without a damages remedy), or is limited
to intentional discrimination. Compare Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 348
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that Title IX reaches disparate impact), with Cannon v. University of Chicago,
648 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 198 1) (holding that Title IX is limited to intentional discrimination).
79. See cases cited in supra notes 48 & 49. For examples of courts that have refused to find intentional
discrimination under Title IX despite clear causation, see, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F.
Supp. 892, 918 (M.D. La. 1996) (finding discrimination against female athletes to be the result of
"arrogant ignorance, confusion regarding the practical requirements of the law, and a remarkably
outdated view of women and athletics," but not an intent to discriminate); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area
Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that dismissal of pregnant student from National Honor
Society under rule forbidding premarital sex was not necessarily intentional discrimination based on
pregnancy).
80. Title VII reaches both intentional discrimination and disparate impact discrimination. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). However, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended
Title VII to provide a damages remedy, damages are available for intentional discrimination only. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1). The Equal Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination. See
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
8 1. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1169 (1995) (criticizing the
equation of intentionality and causation in Title VII jurisprudence); David Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 956-64 (1989) (arguing that an intentional
discrimination standard should focus on causation and not motivation or animus).
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discrimination law: to ensure that persons are not harmed82 because of their sex,
not merely that they are not harmed by ili-meaning actors.

The second important facet of the Court's decision may well have even greater
import. The Court interpreted causation in this context to extend to a school's
deliberate choice to permit discrimination by students to continue unabated,
provided that the school has control over the harasser and the context in which the
harassment occurs. The view that an institution causes the harm when it chooses
not to stop harmful conduct inflicted by others, despite having the power to do so,
is unusually broad in relation to many of the Court's other precedents.83 Yet,
sexual harassment law has long been difficult to reconcile with these precedents.
When an employer permits persons within its control to sexually harass its
employees, even if the harassers do not act as agents of the employer, courts view
the institution's insufficient action as a form of intentional discrimination, with
little explanation.8 4 The employer is liable in such cases for failing to respond to a
82. Thus, the Court treats an institution's response to sexual harassment more like a facial classification, where the harm is clearly imposed because of sex, and unlike the typical disparate treatment case
where the search for causation collapses into an inquiry into motive. Compare UAW v. Johnson Controls,
499 U.S. 187 (1991) ("[A]bsence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory
policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect."), with Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (stating that the "ultimate question" is whether defendant acted with
an intent to discriminate).
83. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (refusing to
hold state accountable for failing to intervene in abuse inflicted by father, despite state's knowledge of
abuse and power to stop it); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employer has no obligation to
correct for disparate impact of standardized tests on African Americans); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979) (state has no obligation to ameliorate severe disparate impact of
veteran's preference on women's job opportunities). One possible way to reconcile the Davis case with
these precedents would be to conclude that a school has a special relationship with its students, and thus
an affirmative duty to protect them, so that the school is liable for permitting discrimination by others.
See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (duty to protect may arise out of special relationship). However,
courts generally have rejected the argument that mandatory education creates a special relationship
between schools and students. See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d
Cir. 1992); J.O. v. Alton Community Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1188 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (rejecting plaintiff's section 1983 claims).
Moreover, such an explanation would not explain the courts' approach to workplace harassment. See
infra note 84.
84. See, e.g., Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994) (in deciding retroactivity of
Civil Rights Act of 1991, assuming that hostile environment claim for coworker harassment is intentional
discrimination); Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771, 779-80 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that a
hostile environment resulting from coworker harassment is intentional discrimination under Civil Rights
Act of 1991); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1030-31 (D. Nev. 1992) (finding
employer liable for intentional discrimination under Civil Rights Act of 1991 when it tolerates
harassment by customers); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903, 905 n. 11, 910 (11 th Cir. 1982)
(treating hostile environment claim as intentional discrimination under Title VII, and recognizing that
hostile environment may be created by supervisors, coworkers, and even third parties); Andrews v.
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (in sexual harassment claim for coworker
harassment brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection violation, court assumes employer
intended to discriminate); Bohen v. East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1187, 1190 (7th Cir. 1986) (same);
Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). Cf Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prod. Corp.,
772 F.2d 1250, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that "an employer intends discrimination where he
condones racial harassment of employees" in claim for racial harassment by coworkers under 42 U.S.C.

1999]

THE GENDER POLICE

sexually hostile environment created by others. By explicitly ruling that the
institution's toleration of such conduct causes the discrimination, and that the
institution itself is discriminating, the Davis decision provides an opportunity to
more fully explain why such cases are properly treated as discrimination by the
institution.
The Court's conclusion in Davis that the school itself causes the discrimination
by its deliberate indifference to peer harassment can best be explained under the
principle that the law prohibits covered institutions from causing discrimination
in the sense of giving added effect to discrimination by others. The Court in other
contexts has occasionally recognized that the state violates the non-discrimination principle when it effectuates and gives its imprimatur to private discrimination. While the Davis Court stopped short of explicitly* adopting this
explanation for why school inaction "effectively 'cause[s]' " the discrimination,86 this rationale best explains the Davis case itself and fits well with the
reality of peer sexual harassment, as argued in the next section.
C.

SCHOOL INACTION CAUSES THE DISCRIMINATION BY EXACERBATING THE
HARM AND EMBOLDENING THE HARASSER

When a school reacts with deliberate indifference to sexual harassment by
students, despite notice of the harassment, the school causes the discrimination in
the sense that its failure to act intensifies the harm and gives greater effect to the
harassment.87 Perhaps even more so in school than in the workplace, the failure
to intervene compounds the harm inflicted by the harassment itself. Because
students tend to perceive the adult world as more powerful than their own, the
failure to intervene is perceived as approval, not merely a neutral lack of
discipline or failure to control the environment. 8 The failure to act is particularly
§ 1981, which requires proof of intentional discrimination); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d
1417, 1421 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
85. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376-79
(1967); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466-67
(1973); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
86. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671.
87. See, e.g., NAN D. STEIN ET AL., WELLESLEY COLLEGE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SECRETS
IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 15 (1993) [hereinafter SECRETS IN PUBLIC] ("In too

many cases, the school's 'evaded curriculum' teaches young women to suffer harassment and abuse
privately. They learn that speaking up will not result in their being heard or believed and that if they insist
on pursuing matters, they will be on their own."). Cf. Writing About Sexual Harassment,supra note 65, at
46-48 (discussing literature explaining the harms to harassment victims when they find their credibility
challenged and their injuries minimized). See also Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized
Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 179
n.12, 201-08 (1997) (discussing "secondary injuries" to discrimination victims when their complaints
are met with intimidation, discouragement and disbelief by their institutions).
88. Amicus Brief for NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al., at * 15, Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1998) (No. 97-843) [hereinafter NOW LDEF Amicus Brief, Davis]
("Students recognize that adults often witness episodes of sexual harassment, and expect adults to see
and feel these violations as they do. Yet, many students (particularly the girls) cannot get confirmation of
their experiences from school personnel because most of those adults do not name it 'sexual harassment'
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harmful when accompanied by messages of blaming the victim, trivializing the
conduct, or dismissing the harassment as "normai"--fiessages cormnonly
conveyed by school officials who fail to intervene. 89 Thus, school indifference to
sexual harassment, and the lack of a serious response, is not neutral, in that it
enhances and intensifies the harm of the underlying harassment, which is itself
based on sex. 90 Indeed, listening to the voices of female victims of peer sexual
harassment suggests that when school officials ignore, trivialize, or fail to stop the
harassment, their response is often as, if not more, harmful than the harassment itself:
I was in summer school on the last day, I was wearing a silk black tank
top and jeans (very baggy). Three guys cornered me and said, 'You
know ifwe raped you right now we could get away with it because
you're dressed like a slut.' That alone made me feel so ashamed and
embarrassed because I thought I looked nice, to have someone say you
look like a slut just crushes your feelings. As if that weren't enough
when I yelled out to my teacher she said 'You know you ask for it-you
get what you deserve,' and she wouldn't help me. She always, in my
opinion, favored the guys. I talked to two other girls in the class and
similar things happened to them, and our teacher seemed to think it was
our fault. [17 year old, Maryland] 9'
I have told teachers about this a number of times; each time nothing
was done about it. Teachers would act as if I had done something to
cause it. Once I told a guidance counselor, but was made to feel like a
whore when she asked questions like, 'Do you like it?' and 'They must
be doing itfor a reason.
What did you do to make them do it?' [13 year
92
old, Pennsylvania]
and do nothing to stop it.") (quoting NAN STEIN, HAMILTON FISH NAT'L INST. ON SCHOOL AND
COMMUNITY VIOLENCE, INCIDENCE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN

K-12 SCHOOLS 35

(1998)) [hereinafter INCIDENCE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT].

89. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Ill.,
138 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing complaint alleging
that "some administrators suggested to Doe that she herself was to blame for the harassment, and that it
was she who ought to adjust her behavior in order to make it stop," and that one administrator in
particular "told Doe and two of her friends to start acting like 'normal' females and scolded them for
making allegations of harassment that might injure some of the male students' futures"); Davis, 118 S.
Ct. at 1667 (citing complaint alleging that when plaintiff reported sexual harassment to the principal, he
asked why she "was the only one complaining"); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 69, 75
(D.N.H. 1997) (stating that plaintiff felt "betrayed by the Londonderry Jr. High School administrators
and the Londonderry School District," where superintendent responded to her complaints with the
attitude that "boys will be boys"). Cf.SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 52
(arguing that "[t]rivialization of sexual harassment has been a major means through which its invisibility
has been enforced").
90. The harm from school inaction may also spillover to other students not directly targeted by the
harassment, thus exacerbating a sexually hostile environment generally. See SECRETS IN PUBLIC, supra
note 87, at I ("The lessons of silence and neglect resulting from official inaction not only affect the
subjects of sexual harassment, they also spread to the bystanders and witnesses. Boys as well as girls
become mistrustful of adults who fail to intervene, to provide equal protection and to safeguard the
educational environment.").
91. SECRETS INPUBLIC, supra note 87, at 9-10 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
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One thing I learned was how unfair the world can be. I took a
photography class and the majority of the class was boys. ...I was in
the darkroom developing pictures and they would come in and comer
me. They would touch me, put their hands on my thighs and slide their
hands up my skirt. They often tried to put my hands down their
pants.... One day I was in the room alone and one of the boys came in.
When I went to leave he grabbed me and threw me down and grabbed
my breast. I felt I was helpless, but I punched him and he ran out. The
teacher (who was a man) came in and yelled at me. When I tried to
explain why I had hit him the teacher told me I deserved it because I
wore short skirts. I was sent to the principal and I had to serve
detention. I didn't tell the principal because I feared he would do the
tell me it was my fault. I felt so alone. [15 year old, New
same and
93
Jersey]
I think schools need to pay more attention to what's going on around
them because girls like me are just dying inside because no one will
believe us. [14 year old, Florida] 94
The recognition that school inaction causes the harm of the underlying
harassment is equally applicable in the context of anti-gay harassment. Victims of
anti-gay harassment experience a similar, exacerbating harm from school indifference to their complaints of harassment. As reported in a five-year study of
anti-gay harassment in Washington state schools by The Safe Schools Coalition:
Some adults who were not perceived as offenders per se, did add to a
young person's distress. Respondents described these adults as witnesses or as people they went to for help after-the-fact, not as offenders,
but some said they were as upset by an adult's response to an incident
as by the actions of the offenders themselves. For example, one high
school freshman who was verbally harassed, spit on, and kicked out of
the locker room by his classmates, reported that his P.E. teacher
responded to the attack by saying, "Maybe you should do more
push-ups. What's the matter, don't you like girls?" 9 5
In addition to the added harm to harassment victims when schools remain
deliberately indifferent to peer sexual harassment, school inaction causes the
discrimination in another way as well. School inaction invites escalation of the
harassment and effectively emboldens harassers to step up their efforts. For
93. Id.
94. Id.at 12-13.
95. Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: UnderstandingAnti-Gay
Harassment and Violence in Schools, Findings: Educators' Strategies (Jan. 1999) <http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5findl 0.html>. See also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1996)
(describing allegations that when plaintiff reported the harassment to school officials, the responses
ranged from "boys will be boys" to telling plaintiff that "if he was 'going to be so openly gay,' he should
'expect' such behavior from his fellow students").
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example, in the Davis case, once G.F. was called to account for himself (in the
96
criminal justice system, not by the school), the harassment immediately stopped.
Until then, the school's apparent indifference provided all the encouragement he
needed to continue the harassment over a period of five months. This type of
reaction by harassers to school inaction is not unusual. When school officials
knowingly turn a blind eye to peer sexual harassment, harassers learn that their
actions are "normal" and even appropriate.9 7 A similar interaction between
harassers' actions and institutional tolerance of sexual harassment has been
documented in the workplace.9 8
This dynamic of school inaction and encouragement of the harassment also
occurs where the harassment targets gay and lesbian students. Delayed or
inadequate school action in response to anti-gay harassment may exacerbate the
harassment and contribute to its severity. The Safe Schools Coalition study of
anti-gay harassment in schools reported that "[s]ome [respondents] expressed
concern that ...less overtly violent incidents seem to serve as invitations to more
intense harassment, especially when adults perpetrate them or fail to intervene." 99 This same study found that in one quarter of the reported incidents of
anti-gay harassment where adult witnesses were present, no adult took any
corrective action.' 00 Respondents connected this inaction to the escalation of
abuse in subsequent incidents:
These cases of apparent neglect by adults were very troubling to
respondents. They spoke about months of verbal violence and public
humiliation by peers that preceded a young person's resort to fists or
dropping out of school or, in one instance, committing suicide. In each
instance, adults had multiple opportunities to put a stop to the very
public abuse of a child or teen and failed to do so.' I
96. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd.of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1999). G.F.'s punishment was
not particularly severe-he was required to write a letter of apology-but it apparently was sufficient to
end the harassment. Harriet Chiang, Justices Say Schools Liable in Harassment Cases; Ruling on
Student-Against-Student Conduct, SAN FRAN.CHRON., May 25, 1999, atA I.
97. See SECRETS IN PUBLIC, supra note 87, at 15 ("At the same time, and as a result of the same
[school] silence, boys in school often receive tacit permission to intimidate, harass or assault girls.
Indeed, if school authorities do not intervene and challenge the boys who sexually harass others, the
schools may be encouraging a continued pattern of violence in relationships."). See also Valerie E. Lee
et. al., The Culture of Sexual Harassment in Secondary Schools, 33 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 383, 406 (1996)
(stating that "students experience more harassment, and more severe forms of it, in schools where they
describe harassment as a serious problem").
98. See John B. Pryor & Nora J. Whalen, A Typology of Sexual Harassment: Characteristicsof
Harassersand the Social Circumstances Under Which Sexual HarassmentOccurs, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 133-34 (William O'Donohue ed., 1997) (describing research
demonstrating that whether local social norms condoned or permitted sexual harassment is an important
factor in whether individuals sexually harass).
99. Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: UnderstandingAnti-Gay
Harassment and Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (Jan. 1999)
< http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5 find I.html>.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Because schools are in charge of and regulate the overall school environment,
school inaction in the face of known peer harassment is perceived by both victims
and perpetrators as condoning the harassment. 10 2 The double-harm from school
inaction-harm to victims and encouragement to harassers--occurs regardless of
whether the school acts out of an intent to discriminate against its students based
on sex. 10 3 The Davis Court implicitly recognized this relationship between
school inaction and harassment by students, concluding that when schools know
of, yet remain deliberately indifferent to, peer sexual harassment in their programs, they
104
should bear the responsibility for the resulting harm to students.
D.

SCHOOL INACTION DISCRIMINATES BASED ON SEX IF THE HARASSMENT
ITSELF IS BASED ON SEX

The Davis Court essentially located the based-on-sex element of the discrimination at the level of the sexual harassment itself by holding the school liable for
action and inaction that gives effect to or exacerbates sexual harassment by
students. The school "cause[s]" discrimination based on sex because it exacerbates the harm, frequency and severity of a sex-based harm inflicted by others,
not because the school itself treats (or intends to treat) students differently
because of their sex.' 0 5 Thus, the school violates Title IX only if the underlying
harassment is itself based on sex.
The key then to explaining why a school's failure to respond to peer sexual
harassment discriminates based on sex lies in explaining why peer sexual
harassment itself discriminates on the basis of sex. While Davis rejected the
symmetry-as-neutrality perspective, and adopted a definition of discrimination
that encompasses actions that give greater effect to discrimination by others, it
did little to explain why peer sexual harassment itself discriminates against its victims
because of their sex. Indeed, the Court simply assumed that the sexual abuse, touching,
and propositions made by G.F. toward LaShonda were based on her sex. '06 Other lower
courts that have recognized claims for peer sexual harassment under Title IX have
that was sexual in
likewise assumed that the harassment-at least if it took a form
10 7
nature-occurred because of sex, with little or no analysis.
102. Cf Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("In addition to
the curriculum, students learn about many different aspects of human life and interaction from school.
The type of environment that is tolerated or encouraged by or at a school can therefore send a particularly
strong signal to, and serve as an influential lesson for, its students.").
103. Cf SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 39-40 ("Whatever they mean,
people who do not take sexual harassment seriously are an arm of the people who do it.").
104. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1672-73 (1999). See also Susan
Fineran & Larry Bennett, Gender and Power Issues of Peer Sexual HarassmentAmong Teenagers, 14 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 626, 627-28 (1999) (citing research documenting educational harms of peer
sexual harassment in school).
105. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1672-73.
106. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1676; see also id. at 1686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he
majority ... has no problem labeling the conduct of fifth graders 'sexual harassment' and 'gender
discrimination.' ").
107. See cases cited infra note 117.
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The same question lies at the heart of the inquiry into why school inaction in
both the peer sexual harassment and anti-gay harassineti cutitexts discriminates
based on sex: why and under what circumstances does harassment between
students inflict harm on the basis of sex? Title IX law to date, including OCR
guidance and court decisions, has provided an inadequate response to this
question. A fuller explanation of why sexual harassment among students occurs
on the basis of sex (and is therefore a form of sex discrimination) is essential in
explaining why a school's failure to intervene violates Title IX. As argued in the
following discussion, Title IX's nondiscrimination principle should extend to
harassment that is labeled "anti-gay," and should not be limited to harassment
that is sexual in nature.
II. THE LINE DIVIDING SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ANTI-GAY HARASSMENT
UNDER TITLE IX

In Title VII sexual harassment cases, courts have long accepted that malefemale harassment that takes the form of unwelcome sexual overtures occurs
because of sex, without further proof that the target was singled out because of
his or her sex.' 0 8 Although the Supreme Court's recent decision in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. reminds courts that plaintiffs must always
establish that the challenged conduct occurred "because of sex," it did little to
disrupt the presumption that unwelcome sexual overtures-at least between men
and women-occur because of sex.' 0 9 In the same breath that it declared that it
has "never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and
women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words
used have sexual content or connotations," the Court nevertheless stated:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the

challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of
108. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("But for her womanhood, from
ought that appears, [plaintiffs] participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited");
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.l 1(1 th Cir. 1982) ("Except in the exceedingly atypical
case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex");
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (assuming sexual harassment includes an intent to
discriminate based on sex).
109. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Oncale involved a Title VII challenge by a male plaintiff, alleging that his
employer failed to take any action to stop a relentless campaign of sexual harassment directed at him by
his male colleagues. The harassment involved conduct of a graphically sexual nature, including sexual
assault, threats of rape and forced sex. The workplace, an oil rig, was all-male, and there was no
allegation that the harassers were homosexual. Lower courts in the case had ruled that same-sex
harassment was not based on sex as a matter of law. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, in an
opinion written by Justice Scalia, holding that same-sex harassment may state a claim under Title VII, as
long as the harassment occurred because of the sex of the plaintiff. However, the Court did not rule on
whether the alleged harassment of Joseph Oncale occurred because of his sex, and instead remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. For a further discussion of Oncale's effect on school harassment,
see John Guenther, Oncale Goes to School: Male-Male Harassment and Gender-Policing, 1 GEO. J.
GENDER & LAW 159 (1999).
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sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not
have been made to someone of the same sex." 10
The presumption that male-female proposals of sexual activity are based on sex is
"reasonable" to the Court apparently because it assumes that the harasser in such
encounters is heterosexual and would not have propositioned a person of the
same sex. This presumption rests on a view of sexual harassment as premised on
sexual desire and attraction-a view that is highly questionable, as discussed
below in Part HI A. Nevertheless, even after Oncale, male-female proposals of
sexual involvement remain presumptively based on sex.
The Oncale Court applied a somewhat different analysis to same-sex harassment. Although the sexual attraction approach is still available to victims of
same-sex harassment in cases where there is "credible evidence that the harasser
was homosexual," absent such evidence, the based on sex requirement in
"
same-sex harassment cases must be established in some other way. While not
purporting to provide an exhaustive list of other methods for proving the
based-on-sex element in such cases, the Oncale Court gave two alternatives for
meeting this requirement. 12 First, if the same-sex harassment involves "such
sex-specific and derogatory terms" as to "make it clear that the harasser was
motivated by general hostility" toward members of the same sex, the harassment
is based on sex." 3 This approach is unlikely to provide a basis for recovery for
many victims of same-sex harassment, as it is rare that a harasser acts out of a
general animus towards his own sex. Second, a victim of same-sex harassment
may offer "direct comparative evidence" that the harasser did not harass
members of the other sex.1 4 Where such evidence is not available, or where the
harasser sexually harassed members of both sexes, this theory would not apply.
Thus, while the lesson in Oncale purports to be that the plaintiff "must always
prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual
",15
connotations, but actually constituted 'discrimination ...because of ...sex,'
the Court's admonishment will probably have little effect on most cases of
involved,
male-female sexual harassment, at least where sexual propositions are
"6
harassment.
same-sex
of
cases
in
problematic
more
prove
will
and
110. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.
11. Id.
112. Id. At least one post-Oncalecourt has read Oncale's suggestions for proving harassment based on
sex as not exhaustive. See Shephard v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) ("we
discern nothing in the Supreme Court's decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to
be exhaustive rather than instructive").
113. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. However, Oncale is having an effect on cases where the harasser makes sexual overtures to both
males and females. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 24 F Supp. 2d 909, 912-16 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding
that harassment of married couple was not because of sex where "equal opportunity harasser" made
sexual requests of both wife and husband). Cf.Yoho v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 43 F Supp. 2d 1021, 1025
(E.D. Wis. 1999) (concluding that sexual graffiti directed at female employee was not because of sex
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Likewise, in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases, Oncale may have greater
implications for same-sex than for cross-sex harassment, at least in cases
involving sexual advances. Title IX cases, like Title VII cases, have agreed with
the assumption sanctioned in Oncale that male-female sexual overtures occur
because of sex. 1 7 Rather than struggling with the because-of-sex requirement in
peer sexual harassment cases, the main difficulty-until Davis-hadbeen one of
explaining why the school's response to the harassment discriminates based on
sex. Peer sexual harassment in school of the male-female variety, like its
counterpart in the workplace, remains presumptively based on sex after1 8Oncale,
at least if it involves "explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity." 1
The legal treatment of anti-gay harassment, however, is more complicated
after Oncale. Anti-gay harassment may include cross-sex harassment and/or
same-sex harassment, and may or may not involve explicit or implicit proposals
of sexual activity. Although anti-gay harassment and sexual harassment are not
distinct, easily divisible categories, the classification of the conduct as either
sexual harassment or anti-gay harassment makes all the difference under sex
discrimination law. Both Title IX and Title VII apply the categorical rule that
sexual harassment is prohibited under the law, but harassment that is based on
sexual orientation is not. 19 By insisting that plaintiffs always demonstrate that
where male employees also were the subject of sexual graffiti); Landrau Romero v. Caribbean
Restaurants, Inc., 14 F.Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D.P.R. 1998) (holding that male-male harassment was not
based on sex where harasser also insulted female employees by grabbing his genitals and using lewd
language to insult female employees). Presumably, these courts have decided that where a harasser
sexually propositions both males and females, a presumption that male-female sexual conduct is based on
sex is no longer reasonable.
117. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Ill.,
138 F.3d 653,655,663 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that female
student's allegations that she was subjected to "unwanted touching, epithets, and the deliberate exposure
of one's genitals" by a self-styled "posse" of male students was sufficient to establish sexual
harassment); Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 1999 WL 176929, at *9-* 11, *47-*48 (D. Minn. Mar.
29, 1999) (treating alleged threats of sexual violence, lewd sexual gestures, and exposure of genitals by
male students to female students as conduct that is based on sex); Haines v. Metropolitan Govt of
Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991,995, 1000 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (accepting plaintiff's allegation that
sexual abuse and attempted rape of female student by male students was based on sex); Nicole M. v.
Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1372, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that unwanted
sexual comments and touching of female student's breast by male student was sexual harassment);
Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F Supp. 1209, 1210, 1214 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that sexual
harassment of female student by male students, including "offensive language, sexual innuendo, sexual
propositions, and threats of physical harm," was because of sex); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F.
Supp. 64, 67, 74-75 (D.N.H. 1997) (holding that male student's retaliation against female student for
refusing to date him, coupled with sexually explicit abusive language, was sexual harassment); Doe v.
Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist. 992 F. Supp. 467, 471, 479-80 (D.N.H. 1997) (finding that male student's
conduct toward female students, "includ[ing] exposing his genitalia, touching girls on the leg, waist, or
breast, and making very obscene comments," was because of sex); Franks v. Kentucky Sch. For the Deaf,
956 F. Supp. 741, 746 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that harassment of plaintiff who was "raped, physically
beaten and sexually abused and harassed" by male student is "presumed to be "based on [plaintiffs]
sex"); see also Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties; Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,047 n.12 (Dep't of Educ.
1997) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance].
118. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 US. 75, 80 (1998).
119. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,036, 12,039 (Title IX); Wrightson v. Pizza
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the
the harassment is based on sex and not some other criteria, even when
20
'
divide.
this
to
add
only
will
Oncale
connotations,
harassment has sexual
In the Title IX context in particular, Oncale may make it more difficult to
situate harassment that is motivated by anti-gay animus as a form of harassment
based on sex. Before the Court decided Oncale, the Office for Civil Rights issued
its policy guidance on sexual harassment in schools, venturing somewhat farther
than Title VII courts by interpreting Title IX to reach harassment against gay and
lesbian students if the conduct is sexual in nature. 21 Thus, under the Office for
Civil Rights approach, both same-sex and cross-sex harassment of gay and
lesbian students is prohibited under Title IX as long as it is sexual in nature,
regardless of whether it is inspired by anti-gay animus. 122 Although, in theory,
this approach could leave room for non-sexual harassment of gay and lesbian
students to be covered under Title IX as a form of gender-based, non-sexual
harassment,1 3 OCR's subsequent discussion forecloses such a result. According
to OCR, "if a male student or group of male students target a lesbian student for
physical sexual advances," such conduct would be encompassed by Title IX;
however, "[i]f students heckle another student with comments based on the
student's sexual orientation (e.g., 'gay students are not welcome at this table in
the cafeteria'), but their actions or language do not involve "sexual conduct,"

Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (Title VII); Dillon v. Frank, 952 E2d 403, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *12-*14 (6th Cir. 1992) (same); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876
F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d
Cir. 1986) (same); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); DeSantis v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (same). See also Writing About Sexual
Harassment,supra note 65, at 38 n.3 (stating that "courts have so far refused to treat harassment based on
sexual orientation as actionable under Title VII," and citing cases).
120. See, e.g., Klein v. McGowan, 36 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889-90 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that
male-on-male harassment based on "the sexual aspect of plaintiffs personality," meaning that plaintiff
was perceived as homosexual, is not based on sex under Oncale); Simonton v. Runyon, 50 F. Supp. 2d
159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that Title VII's because-of-sex requirement does not include conduct
based upon sexual orientation); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75-76 (D.
Me. 1998) (rejecting male plaintiffs claim that harassment by male coworkers was based on gender
where "the only gender-related facts before the court" were that plaintiff is gay and that his coworkers
perceived him as such).
121. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,036, 12,039.
122. Id.
123. Like Title VII, Title IX prohibits harassment that occurs because of the sex of the target, even if
the harassment takes a non-sexual form. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039 &
nn.16, 17. Despite legitimate criticisms of classifying sexual and gender-based harassment into separate
categories, see, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
Rev. 1169, 1211 n. 219 (1998) [hereinafter The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment] (arguing that
both sex-based and sexual-in-nature harassment should be actionable as a form of sexual harassment);
Katherine M. Franke, Gender Sex, Agency and Discrimination:A Reply to Professor Abrams, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1245, 1248 n.28 (1998) [hereinafter Gender Sex, Agency and Discrimination](sharing
the concern that definitions of sexual harassment effectively exclude non-sexual conduct that is based on
sex), anti-gay harassment that is not sexual-in-nature could be prohibited as a form of gender-based
harassment by recognizing that such harassment is inextricably connected to the sex of the target, as
argued below. However, OCR's analysis leaves no room for such an approach.
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Title IX would offer no protection. 124 Thus, where the harassment is not sexual in
nature, and the victim is targeted for harassment because of her sexual orientation
(by persons of either sex), OCR treats25 the harassment as based on sexual
orientation, and not covered by Title IX. 1
After Oncale, OCR's coverage of sexual-in-nature harassment targeting gay or
lesbian students may still be viable where the harassment consists of actual or
attempted sexual contact by students of the other sex. Cases involving this type of
harassment may fare no worse under Oncale because of the presumption that
male-female "explicit or implicit proposals for sexual activity" are "based on
sex." 126 For example, if a group of male students harass a lesbian student by
threatening- to rape her and "turn her around," Oncale's presumption that
male-female proposals of sexual activity are based on sex, and OCR's presumpsexually explicit harassment is based on sex, both lead to the same
tion that
27
'
result.
However, other types of harassment targeting gay or lesbian students may
prompt different treatment after Oncale. In particular, OCR's approach to
sexual-in-nature, same-sex harassment of gay and lesbian students is questionable after Oncale. For example, in contrast to the above example of male-female
sexual proposals to a lesbian student, if male students harass a gay male student
by threatening to rape him, Oncale's presumption that sexual overtures are based
on sex would not apply absent "credible evidence" that the harassers are
homosexual. 1 28 Since Title IX courts to date have followed Oncale in determining the scope of Title IX's protections,1 29 the plaintiff in such a case would have
an uphill battle, notwithstanding OCR's willingness to view all harassment of gay
and lesbian students as based on sex if it is sexual in nature.
As difficult as it may be for victims of same-sex, sexually explicit anti-gay
harassment to proceed under Title IX, anti-gay harassment that is not viewed as
"sexual in nature" has an even more precarious place in Title IX law. Neither
OCR nor Oncale would recognize such harassment as based on sex, and would
instead view it as based on sexual orientation. Thus, under existing precedent,
harassment targeting gay or lesbian students that does not involve sexual
propositions would not be covered under either the Oncale or OCR approaches.
Although OCR's approach to anti-gay harassment diverges to some extent
from that of Title VII cases, after Oncale, OCR's more lenient treatment of
anti-gay harassment rests on shaky ground. Moreover, despite the divergence
124. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039.
125. Id.
126. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
127. However, even in this situation, Oncale's presumption that the harassment is based on sex might
not apply if the same harassers also threaten to rape a gay male student, thus falling into the loophole for
"equal opportunity harassers." See supra note 116.
128. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
129. See, e.g., Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211,219 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that same-sex
harassment may be covered under Title IX and citing Oncale); H.M. and M.M. v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 719 So. 2d 793, 795 (Ala. 1998) (same).
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between OCR and the Oncale decision, both approaches draw a sharp line
between what they view as sexual harassment, and thus based on sex, and what
they view as harassment that is based on sexual orientation, and not sex. This
categorical distinction has thwarted any meaningful analysis of whether anti-gay
harassment also occurs because of sex (in addition to sexual orientation).
Because harassment that is viewed as based on sexual orientation is treated as a
species of discrimination separate and apart from sex discrimination, the Davis
approach to school liability for peer sexual harassment, which locates the
based-on-sex requirement at the level of the harassment, is not applicable to
many forms of anti-gay harassment. Thus, while Davis rejected a requirement
that the school itself discriminate based on the sex of the complainant, such a
showing has been the only method that has succeeded in protecting students from
anti-gay harassment under sex discrimination law. 130 Until courts and OCRrecognize anti-gay harassment as a wrong that is based on sex, plaintiffs and
complainants challenging a school's indifference to such harassment are left with
the onerous burden of proving that the school itself treated her differently because
of her sex.
In the Nabozny case, Jamie Nabozny was able to prove that the school
31
discriminated based on sex when it ignored his complaints of anti-gay abuse.
However, the decision-an important victory for anti-gay harassment victims in
many respects-nevertheless falls far short of securing adequate protection from
anti-gay harassment under sex discrimination law. The Nabozny ruling is limited
in its potential to assist future victims of anti-gay harassment for several reasons.
First, the court required proof that the school district treated Jamie's complaints worse than it treated the harassment complaints of similarly situated
females. In comparing Jamie Nabozny to a hypothetical female student who was
subjected to the type of abuse that Jamie suffered (which included a mock rape),
the court did not elaborate on how to decide when victims of student-on-student
abuse are similarly situated.' 3 2 While the court appeared to require parity in the
school's treatment of anti-gay harassment and male-female harassmentcomparing the treatment of Nabozny with that of female harassment victimsthe court's analogy is not as far-reaching as it may seem at first glance. The
school district's own policy treated sex discrimination and sexual orientation
130. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 E3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that school's failure to
respond to anti-gay harassment of a male student violated equal protection sex discrimination principles
because plaintiff showed that the school did enforce its anti-harassment policy where the harassment
victims were female); Letter from Dep't of Education, Office for Civil Rights, to David S. Buckel, Ref.
06971182 (June 17, 1998) (accepting voluntary settlement of complaint against Fayetteville Public
Schools alleging that the school district failed to address harassment of male student "with the same
degree of urgency and purpose extended to similarly situated female students"); but see Doe v.
Riverside-Brookfield Township, 1995 WL 690749 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 1995) (rejecting equal protection
claim based on school's failure to respond to harassment of a student perceived to be gay where the
plaintiff failed to show that other harassed students had been protected by defendants, and suggesting that
the failure to respond could merely reflect a low level of discipline generally).
131. Nabozny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir 1996); see also supra notes 18-29.
132. Id. at 454-55.
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discrimination on the same footing, which greatly assisted the court in viewing
Jamie Nabozny as similarly situated to female victims of sexual haassment.
Since even the school regarded victims of anti-gay discrimination as similarly
situated to victims of sex discrimination, at least in its official policies, the Court
would have been hard pressed to reject the analogy between the school's
treatment of Jamie and its treatment of female victims of sexual harassment. In
the absence of such a school policy, a court may well find that male victims of
anti-gay harassment are not similarly situated to female victims of sexual
harassment, on the grounds that anti-gay harassment and sexual harassment are
not the same and may be treated differently. 133 Thus, the Nabozny ruling may not
be generalizable to schools that do not purport to treat anti-gay discrimination
and sexual harassment in the same manner.
However, even assuming that this obstacle could be overcome, so that the court
is persuaded that victims of anti-gay harassment and sexual harassment are
similarly situated, the Nabozny approach has more serious problems. The
Nabozny court merely found that Jamie Nabozny had presented sufficient
evidence to get to trial on the issue of whether the school had an intent to
discriminate based on sex. 1 3 4 Because the case was ultimately settled, we do not
know whether Jamie Nabozny would have succeeded in proving that the school
intentionally discriminated against him because of his sex, as opposed to his
sexual orientation, or because of mere inattention to his situation. Convincing a
court or a jury that a school failed to respond to harassment because it intended to
discriminate based on sex has proven to be much more difficult than getting to
trial. 135 Demonstrating such an intent would be even more difficult if the school
did not have a policy or practice of responding adequately to male-female
harassment. In Nabozny, the Seventh Circuit's willingness to infer sufficient
stemmed in part
proof of discriminatory intent to survive summary judgment
1 36
procedures.
stated
its
from
departure
school's
the
from
The underlying problem with the Nabozny approach is that it analyzes the
based-on-sex requirement by looking to the school's own sex-based actions. That
is, it locates the based on sex element at the level of the institutional response to
harassment. The school can always evade responsibility for the harassment under
this theory of sex discrimination by treating complainants of the other sex in the
133. A court could even be assisted in such an analysis by citing legal decisions that treat sexual
harassment and anti-gay harassment as different and unrelated forms of harassment, protecting victims of
the former but not the latter under sex discrimination law. See cases cited supra notes 119, 120.
134. Nabozny, 92 F.2d at 455.
135. See, e.g., Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F3d 776, 781 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming district
court ruling setting aside jury verdict for plaintiff in peer sexual harassment case because evidence did not
support an inference that the school district's actions in response to plaintiff's complaints "were
impermissibly motivated by [her] sex"); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412,
1419-1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (assuming that the alleged peer sexual harassment was based on sex, but
granting defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and setting aside jury verdict for plaintiff on
the ground that plaintiff did not prove that school district intentionally discriminated against her on the
basis of sex when it failed to adequately respond to the harassment).
136. Nabozny, 92 F2d at 455.
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same deplorable manner.' 37 For example, if Jamie Nabozny had been a lesbian
instead of a gay male and had been subjected to the same harassment, her chances
for success under the court's rationale would have been much bleaker. In such a
case, a court would likely find that the school's reason for departing from its
policy of responding to male-female sexual harassment was not have been based
on the sex of the complainant, but rather on her sexual orientation. Likewise,
Jamie Nabozny, as a gay male student, may not have been able to raise the
inference that the school treated him differently because of his sex if there had
been evidence in the record that the school also ignored anti-gay attacks against
lesbian students. Had such evidence existed, the school could have argued that it
treated male and female victims of anti-gay assaults the same. 1 38 Finally, Jamie
would not have succeeded if the school had a poor record of addressing sexual
harassment and assault generally. Thus, a school could protect itself under the
Nabozny rationale by ignoring all harassment complaints, regardless of the sex of
the complainant or the type of the harassment.' 3 9
Nabozny is ultimately unsatisfactory because, unlike Davis, it rests on a
comparative approach to peer sexual harassment cases that requires a school to
treat persons differently based on their sex in order to be held accountable under
sex discrimination law. While a sex-differentiated institutional response to sexual
harassment complaints certainly should be one way to demonstrate that the harm
was imposed because of sex, and may succeed in some cases, it should not be the
only available avenue. If it were, schools could decide to ignore all harassment,
however egregious, as long as they treated victims of both sexes equally. Such an
approach would encourage schools to ignore all harassment complaints, rather
than prevent and remedy conduct that limits the opportunities of individuals on
the basis of their sex-a poor result for a statute designed to provide individuals
with protection from sex discrimination.
137. See, e.g., Doe v. Riverside-Brookfield Township High Sch. Dist., 1995 WL 680749 (N.D. I11.
1995) (dismissing equal protection claim of student challenging school's failure to respond to anti-gay
peer abuse because plaintiff failed to allege that students similarly situated to himself received protection
from the school).
138. Had the Nabozny case gone to trial, the school's treatment of harassment of lesbian students
could well have become a problem. Given the school's apparent intolerance of homosexuality and its
belief that a gay student should "expect" such abuse, it is not unlikely that the school would react with
similar complacency to the harassment of lesbians. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451 (1996).
139. However, such a response could well cause legal difficulty for schools after Davis, since a school
may be liable in damages for responding with deliberate indifference to sexual harassment. Since schools
are unlikely to take such an approach after Davis, victims of anti-gay harassment who are treated with
less concern than victims of sexual harassment may be able to succeed under an alternative rationale
advanced by the Nabozny court. In addition to its sex discrimination ruling, the Nabozny court upheld an
equal protection claim against the school for discriminating based on the plaintiff's sexual orientation,
because the school treated anti-gay harassment victims worse than sexual harassment victims without any
rational basis for doing so. Nabozny, 92 E3d at 457-58. Since Davis now requires schools to respond to
sexual harassment, victims of anti-gay harassment may be able to "bootstrap" a sexual orientation
discrimination claim onto the Davis ruling. However, because courts currently apply only rational basis
review to equal protection claims based on sexual orientation, such an approach would have its own
problems, which are beyond the scope of this article.
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Requiring the institution to discriminate based on the sex of the complainant in
order to prove sex discrimination is a particularly deficient approach for addres-

ing anti-gay harassment. Schools that pay little attention to anti-gay harassment
of members of one sex are likely to also disregard anti-gay harassment of the
other sex. Requiring plaintiffs to prove that their harassment complaints would
have been taken more seriously if the harassment had targeted a lesbian rather
than a gay male (or vice-versa) will do little to remedy anti-gay harassment that is
ignored or condoned across-the-board. On the other hand, if anti-gay harassment
punishes both males and females for stepping outside of the traditional gender
expectations assigned to their sex, ignoring the anti-gay harassment of males and
females discriminates against both sexes. A better approach would recognize the
sex-based nature of anti-gay harassment, and place it on the same legal footing as
peer sexual harassment.
The line that courts and OCR have drawn for differentiating harassment that
occurs on the basis of sex and that which occurs on the basis of sexual orientation
is an untenable one, and does not square with a proper understanding of why
sexual harassment is a sex-based harm in the first place. It also leads to incoherent
results. Harassment that targets gay or lesbian students and involves explicit
sexual propositions by a person of the other sex (such as threats by male students
to rape a lesbian) is more likely to receive Title IX protection, even though it is
not necessarily any more connected to the target's sex than same-sex sexual
harassment (such as threats by male students to rape a gay male student) or
nonsexual, anti-gay harassment (such as physical assaults of gay or lesbian
students) against students perceived to be gay or lesbian. Yet, under current law,
courts are likely to treat the former as based on sex, while treating the later two
situations as not based on sex. Rather than base the analysis on the sexual
character of the harassment and the sex of the perpetrator, we should approach
anti-gay harassment with a clearer understanding of why sexual harassment
among students harms persons on the basis of sex in the first place, and recognize
the overlap between peer sexual and anti-gay harassment.

m. SEARCHING

FOR THE SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT:

MODELS APPLIED TO PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY COURTS AND

OCR

Sexual harassment case law has posited four principle explanations for why
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, or, in other words, why the
harm is imposed on the basis of sex: (1) the harasser acts out of sexual attraction
for the target and would not have selected that person for sexual attention but for
his or her sex (the "attraction" model); (2) conduct that is sexual in nature
inherently differentiates on the basis of sex because it is tailored to the sex of the
target (the "sexual-in-nature" model); (3) sexually harassing behavior has a
disproportionate impact on girls and women (the "disparate impact" model); and
(4) the harasser acts out of a discriminatory animus toward persons of that sex
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(the "motivation" model).1 40 Although these four models may work for some
subset of peer sexual harassment cases, they rely on theories of sexual harassment that are problematic and/or incomplete. The subsequent discussion explores
the shortcomings in each of these theories as applied to peer sexual harassment
generally, and anti-gay harassment specifically. The following section proposes
an alternative to these approaches which would view sexual harassment and
anti-gay harassment as sex-stereotyping that polices and reinforces gender role
boundaries for male and female students. 141
A. THE

ATTRACTION MODEL:

"BUT

FOR HER WOMANHOOD," THE PLAINTIFF

WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN HARASSED

The first courts to recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination
in the workplace adopted the attraction model of sexual harassment, which
remains the most prevalent explanation for why sexual harassment harms persons
because of their sex. These courts grounded sexual harassment as a sex-based
wrong on the theory that the harasser would not have singled out the target for
harassment if the target had been a person of the other sex. 14 2 For these courts, the
harassment is based upon sex because "but for her womanhood," the plaintiff
would not have been harassed by the male harasser-at least in the absence of
140. This categorization expands upon Katherine Franke's pathbreaking analysis of sexual harassment in the workplace in which she identifies and discusses three explanations advanced by courts and
commentators for "what is wrong with sexual harassment:" (1) the "but for" sex, attraction model; (2)
the sexual-in-nature model; and (3) the anti-subordination model (i.e., sexual harassment subordinates
women to men). Katherine Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997)
[hereinafter What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?]. In this article, I discuss two additional theories
(subsumed under Franke's first two categories) for grounding sexual harassment as based on sex: that the
harasser acted with an intent to discriminate, and that the harassment has a disparate impact on women. In
contrast to Franke, I do not address anti-subordination as a separate basis for grounding sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination because I believe that an anti-subordination account is fully
consistent with a gender-role policing model. Gender policing seeks to preserve male dominance and
female submission by shaping the roles of both the harasser and the target, and thus perpetrates the
systemic subordination of women.
141. After offering persuasive critiques of the three models that she identifies, Professor Franke offers
her own proposed account, which views sexual harassment as a "technology" of sexism because it
defines and constrains male and female identity and behavior by enforcing gender roles. While I view my
proposal for student-to-student harassment as fully consistent with her approach, and draw heavily on her
analysis, I have not used her language describing sexual harassment as a "technology" of sexism because
I read this terminology to suggest that sexual harassment exists separate and apart from sexism, and that it
could be used toward other benign ends that do not further sexism (e.g., guns are a technology of war, but
can also be used for hunting). I prefer the terms "gender role policing" or "sex stereotyping" to describe
the gender-role-policing function that I believe is intrinsic to male-female sexual harassment and anti-gay
harassment.
142. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[Blut for her gender
[appellant] would have not have been importuned, and ... there is no suggestion that appellant's
allegedly amorous supervisor is other than heterosexual."); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904
(11th Cir. 1982) ("In the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a female
worker, it is obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees in a similar fashion."); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Only by a redutio ad absurdum could we imagine a
case of harassment that is not sex discrimination where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women
alike.").
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any indication that the harasser was not heterosexual. 43 Under this reasoning, the
harasser is viewed as having acted out of a misguided, heterosexual attraction for
the target. Oncale accepts this presumption as "reasonable" for cases involving
harassers who make unwanted sexual advances to persons of the opposite sex,
and who are presumptively heterosexual.'44 In addition, the U.S. Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights has accepted this theory as one way to
demonstrate that the harassment was based on sex, 1 4 5 and 46a number of Title IX
peer harassment cases could be read to take this approach. 1
The attraction model also has been applied to same-sex harassment cases
where the harasser is perceived to be gay or lesbian and targets a member of the
same sex for unwelcome sexual attention.' 47 The target's sexual orientation is
irrelevant to the formula, which takes as its starting point the attraction of the
harasser to members of the same sex. As with the attraction model of cross-sex
harassment, the theory is that the harasser would not have selected this target but
48
for the target's sex. This type of case-involving the "homosexual predator" 1
as sexual harasser-was recognized as based on sex in the very first sexual
harassment cases under Title VII. 14 9 The Court's decision in Oncale explicitly
approves of this approach to grounding same-sex harassment as based on sex, "if
there [is] credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual," although it does
15
not limit the based-on-sex inquiry in same-sex cases to the attraction model. 0
143. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 (stating that by indicating that plaintiffs participation in sexual
activity with the defendant would enhance her employment status and by working to eliminate plaintiff's
position upon refusal of defendant's advances, the employer signalled that "retention of [the plaintiff's]
job was conditioned upon submission to seual relations, an exaction which the supervisor would not have
sought from any male").
144. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
145. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,047 & n.12.
146. See, e.g., Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995, 1000
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (assuming that harassment of ten-year-old female student who was held down by two
eleven year old male students while they laid on top of her in a sexual manner, fondled her breasts,
genitals, buttocks, and attempted to rape her, was because of sex); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F.
Supp. 64, 74-75 (D.N.H. 1997) (assuming conduct based on sex where female student was called "slut,"
"whore," "fucking bitch," and physically assaulted by male students in retaliation for not dating them);
Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 956 F. Supp. 741, 746 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (finding rape and sexual
assault of female student by male student presumed to be because of sex).
147. See What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,supra note 140, at 696-97 nn.15, 16 (discussing
same-sex cases which apply the attraction model).
148. This term was used by Professor Kathryn Abrams in describing courts' sympathy to males who
are targeted for unwelcome homosexual advances in the workplace. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and
the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2515 (1994) (discussing "the straight male fear of
the spectral homosexual predator").
149. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir.1977) (acknowledging that
imposition of sexual conditions by homosexual supervisor upon same-sex subordinate occurs because of
sex); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same).
150. Oncale, 520 U.S. at 80 (1998). A plaintiff may also succeed in proving the harassment was based
on sex by demonstrating that the harasser acted with a general animus toward persons of that sex, or by
proffering direct comparative evidence that the harasser treated persons differently based on sex in a
mixed-sex environment. Id. These later alternatives for proving the based-on-sex requirement in
same-sex cases are of little value to plaintiffs, as discussed above, and as further discussed later in this
section.
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Like Title VII decisions, Title IX case law has had no difficulty recognizing
same-sex harassment as occurring because of sex where a gay or lesbian harasser
makes unwelcome sexual advances to a target of the same sex.' 5' OCR also
sexual overtures between students as
applies this model to treat 1 5same-sex
2
occurring on the basis of sex.
In contrast, Oncale made clear that the attraction model does not reach
1 53
same-sex harassment where the harasser is not believed to be homosexual.
Even if same-sex harassment involves sexual propositions and overtures, such as
the sexual touching, grabbing, groping, attempted rape, and the type of sexual
propositioning involved in Oncale itself,' 54 it does not fit under the attraction
model absent proof that the harasser is homosexual. Consequently, this model
requires an explicit focus on, and, at least where same-sex harassment is
involved, a determination of the harasser's sexual orientation, in order to evaluate
whether the harassment occurred because of sex.
Using attraction as the centerpiece for explaining why sexual harassment
occurs because of sex over-emphasizes the significance of the harasser's sexual
orientation and ignores and obfuscates the gender dynamics that the harassment
reinforces. As applied to same-sex harassment, the attraction model protects
persons who are offended by sexual overtures from gays and lesbians, but
exonerates harassment targeting gays and lesbians who are perceived as challenging sex stereotypes and failing to conform to traditional gender role assignments.
The attraction model thus grounds the harm of sexual harassment in misplaced
sexual desire, rather than the reinforcement of sexist structures and systems of
sex subordination.
However problematic the attraction model is as applied to harassment in the
workplace, 155 it is even less adequate as an explanation of peer harassment in
schools. Contrary to the premise of the attraction model, much sexual harassment
in school is not about attraction-at least in the sense that attraction is commonly
understood. Boys who have not yet developed their sexual identity may act in a
sexually offensive and abusive manner to female classmates, regardless of
whether they are (at least consciously) romantically or sexually attracted to

151. See Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that molestation/abuse
of male students by male teacher was because of sex); Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch Dist., 94 F3d 463
(8th Cir. 1996) (sexual overtures by female teacher to female student were because of sex), rev'd on other
grounds, 171 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1999); H.M. and M.M. v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 719 So. 2d 793
(Ala. 1998) (same); Donovan v. Mount Ida College, No. 96-10289-RGS, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23048
(D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1997) (same); Does v. Covington City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 940 F Supp. 554 (N.D. Ala.
1996) (same).
152. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,047 & n.12 (stating that harassment of
male student who is repeatedly propositioned by a male student or employee occurs "on the basis of sex"
if "the student would not have been subjected to it at all had he ... been a member of the opposite sex").
153. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
154. See id. at 77; see also Guenther, supra note 109, at 169-70.
155. See What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment, supra note 140, at 732-40 (criticizing attraction
model as applied to same-sex harassment cases under Title VII).
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them. 156 Sexual harassment may be prompted by a desire to punish as much as a
desire for sex.' 5 ' Grounding sexual harassment in a theory of attraction obscures
the power dynamics of sexual harassment, turning it into seemingly benign,
misplaced affection: At a minimum, the application of such a theory necessitates
as
a better understanding of the nature of childhood and adolescent attraction, 158
well as its relationship to sexually harassing and abusive behavior in schools.
An attraction model also fails to adequately explain anti-gay harassment. Even
harassment that targets gay or lesbian students and that involves sexual propositions or advances by persons of the other sex-which, under Oncale, may be
presumptively based on the harasser's heterosexual attraction toward the target-is more about punishment than attraction. 159 A five year study by The Safe
156. See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 752 (2d Cir. 1998)
(involving a group of male sixth graders who subjected female classmates to "sexually derisive names
such as bitches, prostitutes, whores, lesbians and lesbos," called plaintiff a "dog-faced bitch," and
subjected female classmates to "bra-snapping, hair pulling, spitting, shoving paper down their blouses,
punching, pushing and other physical abuse"); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209,
1211 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (upholding sexual harassment claim by female student who was subjected to
repeated sexual harassment from male students, including "offensive language, sexual innuendo, sexual
propositions, and threats of physical harm," and an incident in which one male student exposed his
genitals to the plaintiff and grabbed her breast).
157. See, e.g., Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., No. 6-96-271, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4155 (D.
Minn. Mar. 29, 1999) (stating that male students in alternative secondary school subjected female
students to verbal abuse of a threatening, sexual nature, including making statements such as "suck my
cock," yelling "get her" when female students entered the room, stating a desire to rape women and cut
off their nipples, and stating "I want to smack you to the ground and cut you from the [sexual organ]
up"); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 67 (D.N.H. 1997) (harassment of female student
by group of male students was prompted by plaintiff's refusal to date them and termination of her
romantic relationship with a mutual male friend; harassment included calling plaintiff "slut," "whore,"
"fucking bitch," pushing her into lockers and down stairs, and spitting on her); Burrow v. Postville
Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding that sexual harassment of a
female student by both male and female students was prompted by plaintiff's reporting of property
damage caused by other students).
158. While sexual harassment in the post-secondary setting may approximate workplace harassment
more closely than harassment in elementary and secondary school, an attraction model in the higher
education context would still be problematic for many of the same reasons it has been criticized as an
explanation for sexual harassment at work.
159. Not all feminist scholars would agree that sexual harassment-whether tinged with anti-gay bias
or not-is not about sexual desire. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at
220-21 ("[s]exual harassment (and rape) have everything to do with sexuality.... it eroticizes women's
subordination"); Amicus Brief of National Org. on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. et al., at 20, Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568) (arguing that male-male rapes are
"sexual" even if the perpetrators identify themselves as heterosexuals). While sexual assaults intended to
humiliate and punish gay students for their (actual or perceived) sexual orientation certainly involve
sexual acts and eroticized aggression, viewing such assaults as primarily based on sexual attraction risks
obscuring both the socializing function of peer harassment and the eroticism often involved in
"nonsexual" harassment of students, and gay and lesbian students in particular. See Katherine M. Franke,
Putting Sex to Work, DENv. UNIv. L. REv. 1139, 1143 (1998) [hereinafter Putting Sex to Work] ("First,
once something is classified as sexual, we understand its meaning primarily in erotic terms and lose sight
of the ways in which sex is easily deployed as an instrumentality of multiple relations of power. Second,
we are likely to understand the erotic to be present in too few human behaviors insofar as we deny or
ignore the role of the erotic in behavior less susceptible to being read as "sexual."). Unless the content of
what is defined as sexual attraction is enlarged, so as to be unrecognizable from how the law currently
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Schools Coalition on anti-gay harassment in Washington state schools provides
examples of cross-sex sexual conduct towards gay and lesbian students that
graphically illustrate the centrality of punishment and humiliation to such
0
conduct. 16
At the high school prom, a female student (who was there with a male
date) kissed her female friend (who is openly lesbian); the kiss was
photographed and the picture was circulated around school. One day
after the prom, the first female student was picked up by her male prom
date after school and taken behind the school to a storage building near
the gym, where four male students held the second female student (who
is openly lesbian) hostage. The second student's lip was split and her
clothes torn. The prom date forcibly held the first female student still
and said they were going to teach her friend (the second student) to stay
away from "their" girls. They made (the first student) watch while they
raped and then urinated on her friend (the second student). [Incident 102] 161
A high school male who had spoken about being gay in one of his
classes was harassed by some of his classmates; one day they cornered
him and forced him into an empty classroom. They beat him up and
stripped him, and told him that he could "choose between fucking a
girl and having his cock cut off." The boys held him down while a girl
forcibly raped him. [Incident 100]162
A ninth grade girl and her ninth grade girlfriend were chased under
the bleachers by four male students, who called them "queers,"
"dykes," and "bitches." The male students forced the girls to have sex
with one another while they watched; then they broke one girl's hand,
beat both girls up, and held one of the girls down while they stripped
and raped her girlfriend. [Incident 57] 163
A sixteen year old high school junior female who was dating another
girl was cornered in a hallway by two boys; they pushed her into a
bathroom, said "really ugly things" about her and her girlfriend, and
told her that if she were "normal," she would want to have sex with
them; they pulled her clothes off and forced her to have oral sex with
them; they threatened her that "if you don't want everyone to know
about you and your friend, you'd better start getting it right"; then they
urinated on her. [Incident 92] 164
defines it, using this criteria as a litmus test for deciding whether peer harassment is covered under Title
LX risks excluding much harassment that involves similar gender and power dynamics as harassment that
does fit within an attraction model.
160. Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: Understanding
Anti-Gay Harassment and Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (Jan.
1999) <http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5find .html>.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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While these incidents may well have involved elements of eroticism and
attraction on the part of the harassers, viewing them as primarily about an
attraction to the opposite sex misses much of the dynamic involved. The
presumption-approved of by the Court in Oncale-that the harasser would not
act in such manner toward a person of the other sex (unless the harasser was
homosexual or bisexual) is not convincing in these cases. It is not too difficult to
imagine the same set of harassers turning their aggressions, acted out in a sexual
manner, on a gay or lesbian student of a different sex, rather than the target that
they selected. 65 Sexual aggression, including rape, threats of sexual abuse, and
promises to "turn" the person straight could be made by the same person to both
males and females whose sexuality is perceived to depart from heterosexual
norms, regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser himself.
Just as heterosexual desire poorly describes cross-sex anti-gay harassment,
homosexual desire is overly limiting and insufficient as an explanation for
same-sex anti-gay harassment. Under Oncale, unless the harasser is proven to be
homosexual, same-sex conduct is not based on sex under the attraction model,
even if it involves sexual overtures and contact. 166 Yet much sexual harassment in
school occurs between students who are too young to have formed, realized, or
acknowledged their sexual orientation. 67 Since victims of same-sex harassment
may not be able to prove their harasser's sexual orientation, particularly where
the harasser himself does not even know his sexual orientation, the attraction
model has a very limited capacity to address same-sex sexual harassment in
schools. Such an approach is problematic from the harasser's perspective as well,
since the mere allegation that a student acted out of sexual desire towards a
person of the same sex, and is homosexual, may subject that student to anti-gay
harassment and abuse by his peers. Indeed, this very danger may make courts and
schools less likely to view same-sex peer harassment as based on sex, out of a
reluctance to label young harassers as gay or lesbian. Thus, the attraction model is
a poor method for dealing with same-sex harassment in schools for all parties
involved.
As with other forms of peer harassment, the focus on the harasser's sexual
oreintation and attraction toward a same-sex target misses much of the picture. In
cases involving same-sex anti-gay harassment, even if the harasser is not proven
to be "homosexual," the harassment may nevertheless involve an erotic compo-

165. Martha Chamallas has made a similar point in connection with the harassment in Oncale. See
Martha Chamallas, Remarks at Law and Society Meeting, Roundtable on the New Jurisprudence of
Sexual Harassment, at 2 (May 30, 1999) ("1 get the distinct impression, however, that a female
roustabout would not have been welcomed in this environment.") (paper on file with author).
166. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
167. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999) (involving the sexual
harassment of a fifth grade female student by male classmate); Doe v. Sabine Parish Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp.
2d 655 (W.D. La. 1998) (involving a male kindergarten student who was sexually aggressive and abusive
toward a male student in his class); Haines v. Metropolitan Gov't of Davidson County, 32 F. Supp. 2d 991
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (regarding an eleven year old male student's attempt to rape and sexually assault ten
year old female student).
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nent, even as it expresses contempt for its targets. Perhaps more to the point, the
dynamics of punishment and humiliation take place in same-sex anti-gay harassment, with or without attraction, just as they do in cross-sex harassment, as
168
illustrated in the following examples from the Safe Schools Coalition study.
Fifteen year old freshman female athlete was surrounded by her female
teammates, who just learned she is gay; they verbally attacked her,
calling her "pussy-eater," "bull-dyke," "half-man-half-woman,"
"freak," "fag," and "bitch"; spat on her; told her to get off the team
and not to look at them; and then "pull[ed] her clothes off, grab[bed]
her private parts, and beat the hell out of her." [Incident 51]. 169
Ninth grade male who had been mistaken for a girl by other male
students, including two male students who had been attracted to him
before finding out his gender, was subjected to fierce harassment once
his gender was discovered. He was verbally abused ("cocksucker,"
homoboy,. "I'll tear you another asshole," "we'll make you suck
cock" "faggot"), and subjected to physical attacks and vandalism of
his locker. The harassment escalated to an off-campus sexual assault
where he was orally and anally raped and urinated on by two male
students. [Incident 56] 170
12 year old boy and one other male sixth grade student were sexually
assaulted at elementary school camp by four male sixth graders and two high
school male counselors; the attackers swore at him, beat him up, anally gang
raped him with objects; one attacker vomited on him; and the attackers
threatened to kill him if he reported the assault. [Incident 18]. 171
Eroticized aggression aimed at punishing and humiliating gay and lesbian
students can occur by harassers of both the same and different sex than their
targets, regardless of the harasser's sexual oreintation. Viewing such conduct as
primarily about the harasser's attraction to the target is at best an incomplete
approach to such cases. Anti-gay harassment, like peer sexual harassment
generally, often involves acts calculated to humiliate and express disdain for its
victims. In the Safe Schools Study, for example, three of the eight gang-rapes
reported involved attackers urinating on the victims; a fourth involved vomiting
on the victim. 1 72 The extreme nature of the violence that often occurs during
sexual harassment and abuse of students perceived to be gay and lesbian suggests
that such harassment is about something other than mere attraction toward
persons of one sex.
168. Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: Understanding
Anti-Gay Harassmentand Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (Jan. 1999)
<http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5find 1.html>.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Whether in the context of peer sexual harassment generally or anti-gay
harassment specifically, the attraction model does not begin to explain the
dynamics of peer harassment in the education context. While some sexual
harassment in schools may well stem from an attraction toward persons of the
target's sex, the attraction model obscures much of what is wrong with sexual
harassment and does not sufficiently encompass other forms of peer sexual
harassment that are not based on attraction. Reacting to the inadequacies of an
approach which grounds the based- on-sex requirement in the harasser's presumed attraction to the victim, some courts have considered alternative theories
for finding sexual harassment based on sex. However, the most commonly
adopted alternatives to the attraction model have their own shortcomings.
B. THE

SEXUAL-IN-NATURE MODEL

A somewhat more modem approach grounds the based-on-sex requirement in
the character of the harassment as sexual in nature. Under this approach, sexual
harassment is viewed as not necessarily motivated by the harasser's attraction to
the target, although it may be in some cases. Rather, this theory presumes that
harassment that takes an explicitly sexual form is necessarily based on the
target's sex, regardless of whether it stems from attraction. A number of Title VII
is sexual in nature
cases have taken this approach, finding harassment that
173
necessarily to be based on the sex of the persons harmed.
Courts reviewing Title IX peer harassment claims have tended to follow suit,
presuming that sexually charged harassment necessarily occurs on the basis of
sex, with little or no analysis. 174 This presumption is not limited to cross-sex
harassment. Courts have reached the same result in Title IX cases involving both
male and female harassers, which necessarily involve same-sex harassment as
well as cross-sex harassment.1 7 5 Even in cases where the harasser directs
173. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The intent to
discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials,
or sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of course. A more
fact intensive analysis will be necessary where the actions are not sexual by their very nature."); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) ("In cases involving claims of sexual harassment... the sexual
advance or insult almost always will represent 'an intentional assault on an individual's innermost
privacy,' " and discriminates based on sex); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 893 F. Supp. 1263,
1277 (D. Del. 1994) ("Because at least some of the conduct at issue was sexually explicit, it is fair to
draw the conclusion that, by virtue of this conduct, plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination because of
her sex."), affid, 112 F.3d 710 (3d Cir. 1997); cf Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Moreover, sexual harassment is ordinarilybased on sex. What else could it be based on?") (emphasis
in original).
174. See, e.g., Oona, R.S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding sexual
harassment claim where "[b]oys allegedly referred to girls' body parts as 'melons' and 'beavers,' called
the girls slang terms for whores, and persisted in other types of offensive behavior"); Doe v. Oyster River
Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467, 479-80 (D.N.H. 1997) (finding that harassment of female students
throughout seventh and eighth grade was based on sex where the harassment consisted of male student
exposing his genitals, touching girls on legs, waist and breast, and making obscene comments and
sexually explicit drawings).
175. See, e.g., Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1414, 1420 (N.D.
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sexually explicit conduct to both males and females (the so-called "equal
have assumed that the conduct occurred on the
opportunity harasser"), courts
76
1
LX.
Title
under
basis of sex
The Office for Civil Rights has endorsed this approach, stating that Title IX's
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex is violated whenever the harassment is
sexual in nature. t 77 OCR would apply this rule to all forms of sexually explicit
harassment, "even if the harasser and the harassed are of the same sex or the victim of
harassment is gay or lesbian." 78 As one example of harassment that is based on sex,
OCR describes an incident where "female students allegedly taunted another female
student about engaging in sexual activity." 179 OCR does not explain why such
conduct would necessarily be based on the taunted student's sex.
After Oncale, the theory that sexually explicit harassment is inherently based
on sex is questionable, at least if the harassment did not consist of "explicit or
18 0
Although
implicit proposals of sexual activity" between males and females.
Oncale primarily concerned itself with determining whether same-sex harassment occurs on the basis of sex, the Court did not limit its discussion to same-sex
harassment. The Court stated, "even harassment between men and women is
[not] automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used
have sexual content or connotations." 1 8' Oncale thus rejects a blanket assump82
tion that sexually explicit language or behavior is inherently based on sex.' In
Iowa 1996) (holding that a jury could reasonably find harassment to be based on sex where male and
female students called a female student "whore," "bitch," "slut," and subjected her to sexually explicit
graffiti, but denying liability because plaintiff failed to prove that school intended to discriminate);
Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1196,1206 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding that
harassment of female student by both male and female students, which included calling plaintiff a "slut,"
"whore;" "bitch," "skank," and "fuckin' tramp," kicking plaintiff "between her legs in a sexually
offensive manner," and writing sexual obscenities about her, "could reasonably be viewed as being
'sexual-in-nature, as defined in the hostile environment context,' and thus, 'on the basis of sex'); Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1564-65, 1567 (1993), affd, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding that "at least some" incidents of verbal harassment by male and female students, including
statements that a female student had sex with a hot dog, and calling her "hot dog bitch," "slut," and
"ho," "clearly do concern harassment on the basis of sex," but not indicating why or which incidents).
176. See Doe v. Sabine Parish Sch. Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 655, 666 (W.D. La. 1998) (upholding peer
harassment claim where male kindergarten student was sexually aggressive toward another male
kindergarten student, even where the aggressor had also acted in a sexually aggressive manner toward a
female kindergarten student, without explaining why the conduct was because of the male victim's sex);
Wright v. Mason City Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1420 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (assuming that harassment
by female students of another female student, including call her "whore," "bitch," and "slut," was based
on sex, even where the same students also harassed a male student who befriended the plaintiff, but
denying liability because plaintiff failed to prove that the school district intentionally discriminated
against her because of sex).
177. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,047 n.12.
178. Id. at 12,036.
179. Id. at 12,047 & n.13.
180. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
181. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
182. When confronted with male-female conduct that involves sexual propositions or intimate acts,
however, Oncale suggests that it is "reasonable" for courts to presume that the challenged conduct is
based on sex. See id.
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light of Oncale, plaintiffs must at a minimum have a theory for explaining why

sexually explicit language or behavior is based on sex.
The apparent (if unarticulated) theory behind the sexual-in-nature model is that
sexually explicit harassment is necessarily tailored to the sex of the recipient,
such that it would not have occurred in precisely the same form had the plaintiff
been a member of the other sex. 18 3 Professor Martha Chamallas has described
this connection between the harassment and the plaintiff's sex as the use of

different sexual "scripts,"that vary depending on the sex of the target.' 84 This
theory is consistent with the approach taken by the courts that follow this
model. 185 The Office for Civil Rights is more explicit in its endorsement, stating
that harassment is based on sex when "the student's sex was a factor in or
affected the nature of the harasser's conduct, or both." ' 8 6 As an example of such a
case, OCR approvingly cites a Title VII case in which a supervisor directed
sexually explicit comments toward both a male and female employee who were
married to one another.187 In that case, the court found that the harassment of both
employees was based on sex because the sexual comments directed to each
employee were tailored to that employee's sex.1 88 After Oncale, however, the
viability of this rationale is shaky at best. Although Oncale did not explicitly
foreclose this method for demonstrating the based-on-sex requirement, it was not
among the approaches endorsed by the Court. More importantly, had the Court
approved of such a theory, there would have been no need to remand the case
back to the lower court for further scrutiny of whether the conduct was based on
sex. The specific conduct in the case, which included the grabbing of the
plaintiff's testicles, was clearly tailored to the plaintiff's sex. It could not have
occurred in the same manner had the plaintiff been female.
Regardless of whether the sexual-in-nature model survives Oncale, it should
be reconsidered as a primary vehicle for explaining why peer sexual harassment
harms students because of their sex. Although the sexual-in-nature theory has the

183. An alternative theory, that sexually explicit harassment necessarily has a disparate impact on one
sex, is addressed in the following section.
184. Remarks of Martha Chamallas, supra note 165.
185. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1999); Oona, R.S. v.
McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 475 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that boys referred to female students by slang
names for female body parts, such as "melons," and "beavers," and called them whores); Nicole M. v.
Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1372, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (upholding sexual
harassment claim where male students made unwanted comments about female student's breasts and on
one occasion touched her breasts in class); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D.
Ga. 1994) (harassment included repeated attempts to touch female student's breasts and vaginal area).
186. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,047 & n.12.
187. Id. (citing Chiapuzo v. BLT Operating Co., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1993)).
188. See Chiapuzo, 826 F. Supp. at 1337-38; see also Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d
1459, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that female employees' sexual harassment claims were not
undermined by harasser's simultaneous abuse of male employees, since the harasser's mistreatment of
the women was "different .... While [he] may have referred to men as 'assholes,' he referred to women
as 'dumb fucking broads' and 'fucking cunts,' and when angry at [plaintiff], suggested that she have sex
with customers").
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advantage of having a broader reach than the attraction model (including in its
reach, for example, the bisexual harasser and sexually explicit same-sex harassment of gay and lesbian students),' 89 without necessitating any inquiry into the
harasser's subjective reasons for selecting the target, its greater comprehension
comes at the expense of losing sight of why peer sexual harassment harms
students on the basis of their sex. Moreover, as discussed below, the sexual-innature model, as explained by the different sexual "scripts" rationale, is less
comprehensive than it appears. As an analytical underpinning for a peer sexual
harassment claim, this model is weak-both in terms of its descriptive value in
explaining why such conduct treats male and female students differently, and its
normative value in explaining why sexual harassment imposes a sex-based harm.
The premise of the sexual-in-nature model, that sexually charged conduct is
necessarily tailored to the sex of the target, provides a poor explanation for why
sexual harassment discriminates on the basis of sex. Even in the easiest of these
cases, where verbal or physical conduct is specific to the anatomy of one sex, it is
not obvious why the conduct discriminates against the target on the basis of sex.
The analysis underlying the model is rather superficial: if the harasser grabs the
genitals of the target, the behavior occurred on the basis of the target's sex
because it involved anatomy specific to that person's sex.' 90 This approach
trivializes the sex-based harm of the harassment by suggesting that it comes
down to breasts and genitals; a harasser who grabs the genitals of male and
female students treats them differently on the basis of sex by touching their
different anatomy.
The sexual-in-nature model also neutralizes the sex-based harm if the "scripts"
do not differ. A harasser who uses the same anatomically-specific language for
both girls and boys, for example, calling girls "cunts" and "pussy," while
directing those same epithets at boys viewed as not measuring up to masculine
norms, has not tailored the harassment to the target's sex, and would not fit within
this rationale. By pretending that all sexually charged conduct distinguishes
between males and females, the sexual-in-nature model obscures the reality that
not all unwelcome sexual conduct plays out differently based on the sex of the
target, and does not explain why such abuse nevertheless imposes harm based on
sex.

Harassment that does not involve anatomy specific to one sex is even less
suitable for the sexual-in-nature model. Conduct that consists, for example, of
grabbing a person's buttocks, or involves sexual threats or propositions that could

189. A number of gay rights groups have advocated this approach, presumably as a means of covering
more anti-gay harassment than would otherwise be covered under existing sex discrimination law. See,
e.g., Amicus Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et. al., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568). For reasons discussed below, I believe that a sounder approach
would be to recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping and
the policing of gender roles.
190. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing incident where
harassers grabbed H. by the testicles and announced "I guess he's a guy").

80

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW

[Vol. 1:37

be made to either men or women (such as, "I'm going to rape you") could target
both males and females.' Even sexual acts themselves may not vary depending
on the sex of the target, as many sexual acts can be performed by and between
partners of either gender.
Likewise, whether or not the harasser's "script" is specific to male or female
anatomy, if both males and females are exposed to the harassment, and no
individual is singled out for targeted abuse, the sexual-in-nature model does little
to explain why the conduct is based on sex. If the challenged conduct did not
target any particular individual, it would be difficult to argue that the form of the
harassment is tailored to the sex of the individuals exposed to it.
For all of the model's flaws as applied to peer sexual harassment generally, the
sexual-in-nature model is especially problematic as applied to anti-gay harassment. Like much sexual harassment between students, sexually explicit harassment of gay and lesbian students is not always tailored to the target's sex. 192 But
applying a sexual-in-nature model to anti-gay harassment has a more fundamental problem: at a basic level, all anti-gay harassment is sexual-in-nature by virtue
of the fact that the target's sexual preference is the reference point for the
harassment. In a very real sense, any time harassment invokes a person's sexual
orientation, by definition, it is sexual-in-nature because it alludes to the target's
perceived sexual preference. 193 Yet, by drawing the line at conduct that takes an
explicitly sexual form, and excluding references to sexual orientation alone, the
sexual-in-nature model as it has been applied to anti-gay harassment is unprincipled.
191. Compare Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., No. 6-96-271, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4155 (D.
Minn. Mar. 29, 1999) (finding that female student told to "suck my cock" by male students), with Safe
Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: UnderstandingAnti-Gay Harassment and Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (Jan. 1999) <http://
www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5findl.htm]> (describing situation in which gay male high school student
was subjected to verbal abuse by male students, including calling him "Faggot," and saying "Do you
want to suck my dick?" [Incident 85]). See also Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 140 F.3d 776, 777-79
(8th Cir. 1998) (assuming sexually charged environment to be based on sex where male students drew
naked pictures of girls, touched female student's bottom, talked about sex and having babies, made
inappropriate sexual remarks about Freddy Kruger, fictional character in Nightmare on Elm Street,
directed inappropriate remarks about sex to another female student and told female student and her
brother that they were homosexuals).
192. Compare Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: Understanding Anti-Gay Harassmentand Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happenedin These Incidents? (Jan.
1999) <http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5findl.html> (describing incident in which male fifth grade
student was subjected to rumors that he is gay; another male fifth grader comes up behind him and pulls
down his pants on playground, yells racial slurs and "you stay away from me or I'll kick your butt."
[Incident 16]); with id. (describing incident where female high school freshman was called "lesbian" and
"whore;" on one occasion, group of twenty students, mostly male but led by one girl, pull her clothes
down and threaten to "kick her butt" because she is a lesbian. [Incident 42]). Compare id. (describing
situation in which male ninth grader who is bisexual and "transgendered" was harassed by male students
who "brush up against him in a sexually menacing way." [Incident 48]); with id. (describing incident in
which five middle school boys cornered two ninth grade girls, call them "queers," "faggots," and
"dykes," and "brush[] up against them in a sexual way." [Incident 25]).
193. OCR's definition of "sexual-in-nature" includes sexual language (such as teasing someone about
their sexual activities, calling them a "whore," etc.), and is not limited to sexual touching. Sexual
Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,033 & n.6, 12,034 & nn. 12, 13.
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For example, OCR states that sexual advances by male students toward a
lesbian student are sexual in nature, but that student comments excluding gay
students from the cafeteria are not sexual in nature. 194 Yet, OCR does not explain
why language targeting certain students because of their actual or perceived
sexual orientation is not sexual in nature. Perhaps if the anti-gay comments in the
cafeteria example included other, more graphic sexual references,' 95 OCR would
find sufficient sexual content to rule that the harassment is sexual in nature; but it
is unclear what degree of additional sexual content would suffice. Although OCR,
like the courts, has treated the sexual-in-nature category as if it were selfexplanatory, in fact, it requires interpretation-an interpretation 96
that is obscured
by presuming that anti-gay harassment is not sexual in nature." 1
Perhaps more importantly, even if it were possible to separate harassment that
is sexual in nature from other forms of anti-gay harassment, it is questionable
whether it makes sense to do so. Anti-gay harassment typically involves the same
dynamic of humiliation and punishment, whether or not it takes an overtly sexual
form. As discussed above, even sexual assaults of gay and lesbian students may
be more about violence, humiliation, and intimidation than sexual gratification.
Sexual language and conduct may be one of the means that harassers use to hurt
their victims, but it is not clear that the use of sexual activity as a tool of
humiliation and punishment is based on the sex of the victim any more than
197
anti-gay epithets or non-sexual violence are based on the victim's sex.
Much anti-gay harassment that involves a sexual component is inseparable from
the accompanying violence and anti-gay epithets that target and punish the victim
for his or her perceived sexuality. The incoherency of the sexual-in-nature model
as applied to anti-gay harassment stems ultimately from the treatment of
harassment based on sex and harassment based on sexual orientation as distinct
and mutually98 exclusive categories, when in fact they are interlocking and
inseparable.
Contrary to the premise of the sexual-in-nature model, not all peer harassment
with a sexual component is specifically tailored to males or females such that it
could not be directed toward a person of the other sex. Given the wide variety of
ways that students can sexually harass one another, much abuse that is sexual in
nature could be directed at both males and females. The sexual-in-nature model
194. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039.
195. See, e.g., Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: Understanding Anti-Gay Harassmentand Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (Jan.
1999) <http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5find l.html> (describing harassment in which male student
was subjected to anti-gay epithets, including "buttfucker." [Incident 39] & describing situation in which
male student was subjected to anti-gay epithets, including "cocksucker." [Incident 99]).
196. Cf Putting Sex to Work, supra note 159 (arguing against "essentializing" sex as something
inherent and pre-existing, and instead for a recognition of the cultural construction of what is "sexual").
197. For a description of numerous examples of anti-gay, non-sexual violence in schools, see Safe
Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: UnderstandingAnti-Gay Harassment and Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (Jan. 1999) <http://
www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5find 1.html>.
198. See discussion supra Part II.
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does little to explain why such conduct should nevertheless be considered to be
based on sex. Moreover, even where the harassment is tailored to the sex of its
target, the sexual-in-nature model fails to capture the gender dynamics that
animate sexual harassment generally, and anti-gay harassment specifically.
C.

THE DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS
DISPROPORTIONATELY HARMING WOMEN AND GIRLS

An alternative approach to explaining why sexually explicit harassment
discriminates on the basis of sex would be to recognize that the harms resulting
from such conduct fall disproportionately on girls and women. Under this
rationale, even if sexual harassment could and does affect both male and female
victims, it would still be based on sex if it disproportionately harms female
students.
The Seventh Circuit suggested such a rationale in Doe v. University of
llinois,'99 in which it criticized the Fifth Circuit's Rowinsky decision for
requiring plaintiffs to prove that schools react differently to sexual harassment
complaints by boys and girls.2"' The Seventh Circuit rejected the Rowinsky
formulation of the based-on-sex requirement on the ground that it ignored the
reality that sexual harassment complaints are made more often by females than
by males. The court concluded that, because of this difference, school inaction in
the face of sexual harassment will have disparate impact on female students,
stating:
Occasional exceptions do not alter the rule that sexual harassment is an
evil that affects mostly women and girls. For this reason, it must be
exceedingly rare that a school receives any complaints of sexual
harassment from its male students. The Fifth Circuit's rule would leave
schools completely free to ignore the more frequent complaints of
sexual harassment from girls, while imposing only the minimal cost

that such schools would be required likewise to ignore any complaints
they might receive from their male students.20 1

In addition to the different frequency with which male and female students
experience sexual harassment, sexual harassment may have a disparate impact
because it results in greater harm to female students. OCR has accepted a

disparate impact theory on this basis, stating that, where harassment affects both
sexes, but impacts members of one sex more severely than the other, it is based on
sex and is covered under Title IX.2 0 2 Some Title VII cases also have grounded the

199. 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).
200. Id. at 662.
201. Id. at 662.
202. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,047 & n.12 ("In other circumstances,
harassing conduct will be on the basis of sex if the student would not have been affected by it in the same
way or to the same extent had he or she been a member of the opposite sex").
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because-of- sex requirement in the disproportionate effect that sexual harassment
has on women, even20 3if both men and women are subjected to the offensive
language or conduct.

While some studies support this model by showing that sexual harassment in
schools is a phenomenon that more often harms females than males (either
because it happens with greater frequency or because it has a more severe
effect) 2 0 4 this approach to the based-on-sex requirement nevertheless falls short
as a theoretical grounding for peer sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. The argument for a disparate impact model of sexual harassment may be
less compelling in the education context than it is in the workplace due to
differences between the school and work settings. Much of the theory for why
sexual harassment at work has a greater negative impact on women than men is
based on the premise that the infusion of sexuality into the workplace penalizes
and stigmatizes female employees in part because of women's subordinate
position in the workplace.2 °5 The persistent restrictions on women's opportunities and rewards as workers, particularly in non-traditional fields, and the
ongoing sex segregation of the labor force, may render women more susceptible
to being perceived as sex objects in the workplace.20 6 Thus, the sexualization of
the workplace may disadvantage female employees more than male employees,
undermining the perception of women as competent workers.20 7
However, in the education sphere, the connection between sexuality and sex
heirarchies in education is more questionable. Although some education programs remain male-dominated, and a disproportionate harm theory may well
apply to sexual harassment in such programs,20 8 female students outnumber male
203. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (recognizing conduct "that is not directed at a particular individual or group of individuals, but is
disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to one sex" as a category of "actionable conduct")
(citations omitted).
204. See, e.g., Lee et. al., supra note 97, at 385 (citing Massachusetts survey finding girls more likely
than boys to be sexually harassed in school, especially for more severe forms of harassment); id. at 396,
400, 403-05 (finding that girls were more likely than boys to have been sexually harassed at school, that
girls were harassed more severely than boys, and that girls suffered greater academic and psychological
consequences from the harassment than boys); cf Sandra S. Tangri et. al., Sexual Harassmentat Work:
Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 33, 43 (1982) (citing findings from literature and
research on workplace sexual harassment that women are much more likely to experience sexual
harassment at work and that a higher percentage of female than male harassment victims experienced the
most severe forms of harassment).
205. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 4 (arguing that sexual
harassment reinforces and expresses women's inferior role in the labor force); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1755 (1998) (arguing for a reconsideration of the
hostile environment paradigm as rooted in the preservation of male dominance in the workplace).
206. See Gender Discrimination, supra note 66, at 1202-05 (arguing that women's position as
"outsiders" in the workplace renders them more vulnerable to unwelcome sexual conduct).
207. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(finding that activity which sexualizes the work environment is particularly detrimental to female
workers); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 859-60 (1991) (arguing that sexuality at
work may be per se injurious to women workers).
208. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,047 & n. 12 (citing as an example of an
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students in many general academic programs. 20 9 For education programs in
which girls and women are not a minority of participants, it is not clear that
exposure to sexual material and conduct would disproportionately harm them.
In addition to distinctions between male-female hierarchies in the workplace
and in school, sexuality generally may differently affect the work and school
environments. Although the sexualization of an employment environment may
undermine the image of women as competent workers, based in part on the
conflict between viewing women as sexual and viewing them as competent
employees, it is not necessarily the case that a similar conflict exists for female
students. Part of the socialization process that occurs in school involves learning
to relate to peers socially (including sexually), as well as academically. It may be
possible for students to interact sexually and, in certain instances, in a sexuallycharged school environment, without disproportionately impairing the ability of
girls and young women to function as competent students.
By treating all sexually explicit conduct as based on sex, the disparate impact
model may overstate the connection between the presence of sexuality in school
and sex-based harm. For example, if a group of uninhibited girls spoke graphically about their own sexual experiences to a more inhibited girl, assuming such
behavior otherwise met the requirements of unwelcomeness, pervasiveness, and
objective offensiveness sufficient to create a hostile environment, the disparate
impact model would view the resulting harm as sex-based because of the
presumed disparate impact on female students. 210 Yet, it is not necessarily the
case that such sexual discussions and interactions in school necessarily would
harm female students disproportionately.
The case of Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc. ,2 further
demonstrates the limits of this model as applied to the school setting. In that case,
a male and female student sued their school under Title IX for subjecting them to
an allegedly hostile environment by requiring them to attend a sexually explicit
AIDS awareness lecture. The lecture "advocated and approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual activity, and condom use during promiscuous sexual
activity," and included "simulated masturbation" and other graphic sexual
displays. The First Circuit dismissed the students' claims on the ground that being
required to attend a single sexually explicit lecture did not rise to the level of
severity or pervasiveness necessary to create a hostile environment under Title
IX. 212 Perhaps the bigger problem with such a claim-a problem barely alluded
instance where members of one sex may be harmed to a greater extent than those of the other sex, the
distribution of pornography and sexually explicit material in a mostly male shop class).
209. See Jeff Ristine, Men Losing Ground in College Ranks, SAN DIEGo UNION-TRIB., Sept. 27, 1999,
at B4 (reporting that women are outpacing men in college enrollment); see also Women Gaining Ground
- Except in Technical Fields, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Aug. 20, 1999, at A22 (identifying gender
disparaties in male-dominated educational fields).
210. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,039 & n. 13 (listing as an example of sexual
harassment, a campaign of sexually explicit graffiti directed at a particular girl by other girls).
211. 68 F.3d 525 (lst Cir. 1996).
212. id. at 540-41.
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to by the court2 ' 3 -is that even if the complained of conduct had occurred more
frequently, it is difficult to explain why such material harmed the complaining
students because of their sex. Indeed, accepting the premise that female students
are necessarily more harmed than male students by exposure to sexual material
risks reinforcing stereotypical protectionist views of female sexuality.
While sexually explicit language and conduct retain the potential for harming
persons based on sex in the school environment, as in the workplace, the function
of schools as instruments of socialization and sites of learning makes it impossible (and probably undesirable) to eliminate sexual content from the school
environment. The failure to do so is not necessarily more harmful to female
students.
The theory that sexual harassment harms girls and women more than it harms
boys and men is also less than ideal from a doctrinal perspective. Peer sexual
harassment typically has been viewed as a form of disparate treatment, or
intentional discrimination, as opposed to a facially neutral practice with a
disparate impact. 2 14 Because the law (constitutional as well as statutory) provides
greater protection against intentional discrimination than it does for disparate
impact, there are clear advantages from a plaintiff's perspective in categorizing
sexual harassment as a form of intentional discrimination.215 Yet, grounding the
sex-based harm of sexual'harassment in the notion that it has a disparate effect on
women in comparison with men brings the wrong more in line with disparate
impact discrimination. Although the value judgment that places disparate treatment higher on the discrimination hierarchy than disparate impact is certainly
subject to challenge, and should be challenged, the theoretical placement of
sexual harassment within these categories has important practical implications
that should not be ignored.
The disparate impact approach to sexual harassment raises additional doctrinal
problems because it would open the door to a case-by-case analysis of whether
the harassment in a particular case affects men and women at that institution
213. In concluding that plaintiffs failed to explain how the program and its aftermath "created an
atmosphere so infused with hostility toward members of one sex that [it] altered the [educational
environment] for them," the court stated that, "if anything, then, [plaintiffs] allege discrimination based
upon the basis of viewpoint, rather than on the basis of gender." Id. at 541. However, the court couched its
discomfort with the based-on-sex element of the claim in the context of evaluating whether the conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile environment.
214. See, e.g., Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
("Indeed, it is difficult to see how most cases of sexual or racial harassment would be amenable to
disparate impact analysis. Harassment claims do not challenge facially neutral standards that have a
disparate impact on members of a protected class; they address intentional conduct."); Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 949 F Supp. 1415, 1422-24 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (characterizing peer sexual harassment as a
form of disparate treatment discrimination, and citing Title VII decisions that also treat sexual harassment
as disparate treatment discrimination); see also supra note 84.
215. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified at 42 U.S.C. 198 1(a)(1) (limiting the right to jury trial
and the availability of compensatory and punitive damages to intentional discrimination under Title VII);
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding Title IX provides a damages
remedy for intentional discrimination); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)
(limits the Equal Protection Clause to reach only intentional discrimination).
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differently in terms of its frequency or severity. If the frequency and impact of
sexual harassment fall equally on the shoulders of males and females at a
particular school, the disparate impact approach suggests that no one would
experience discrimination on the basis of sex when the institution fails to
respond. Or, put another way, the sexual harassment of women and girls could be
neutralized by demonstrating comparable levels of sexual harassment of male
students that result in similar harms. Particularly at an institution where women
are a minority, such as the newly sex-integrated Virginia Military Institute or the
Citadel, it is quite possible that sexually explicit conduct could harm as many
men, and to as great a degree, as it does women. In such cases, sexual harassment law, if
grounded on this theory, would be of little or no assistance to harassment victims.
Finally, the notion that female students necessarily experience greater harm
from sexual harassment than male students has little application in the context of
anti-gay harassment. The harms resulting from anti-gay harassment appear to
have little or no correlation to the victim's sex.2 16 If any conclusion about the
correlation between the victim's sex and the impact of anti-gay harassment were
to be drawn, it would be that male students have a somewhat greater likelihood of
being the targets of anti-gay harassment in school.2 17 Yet, it would be a mistake to
conclude that anti-gay harassment is based on sex simply because males are
disproportionately disadvantaged by it. Too many female students are the victims
of anti-gay harassment to conclude that it is a phenomenon that discriminates
predominantly against males. Limiting anti-gay harassment to a form of sex
discrimination against males would deny the harms and extent of anti-gay
violence experienced by female students, and reinforce sex-based notions of the
invisibility of lesbians in law and society.
Instead of grounding sexual harassment as sex-based discrimination because
of a disparate impact on persons of one sex, the law should recognize the
sex-based harms it inflicts on males and females, and allow for the possibility that
both sexes may be sexually harassed.
D.

THE MOTIVATION MODEL: THE DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVE OF THE HARASSER

A fourth alternative for explaining why peer sexual harassment is based on sex
looks to the discriminatory intent, or motive, of the harasser. Under a motivation
216. See Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: Understanding
Anti-Gay Harassment and Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (last
updated Jan. 1999) <http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5find 1.html>; see also Fineran & Bennett, supra
note 104, at 636 (finding that girls generally perceive all forms of peer sexual harassment as a greater
threat than boys, but that "[t]he two behaviors that were not significantly different [by gender] were being
called gay or lesbian and being the victim of sexual graffiti").
217. See Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: Understanding
Anti-Gay Harassment and Violence in Schools, Findings: What Happened in These Incidents? (last
updated Jan. 1999) <http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5find l.html> (reporting that, of the Il1 reported
incidents of anti-gay harassment in Washington state schools, about one half of the targets were male,
one-quarter of the targets were female, and the remaining incidents targeted both males and females or
did not target any specific individual).
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model, the harasser's intent, rather than the character of the harassment, is
dispositive of whether the harassment is based sex. 18 Several Title IX courts
have suggested that the motivation of the harasser, and whether the harasser acted
with an intent to sexually harass or demean the plaintiff because of her sex, is
the key to determining whether the harassment occurred on the basis of
sex. These courts have suggested that even where the harassment takes
a sexual form, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the harasser acted with a
discriminatory motive in order to prove that the conduct was based on
sex. 2 19 OCR also suggests that the harasser's intent may be determinative in
deciding whether the harassment was based on sex, at least if the harasser
subjects both males and females to sexual misconduct.22 ° Oncale endorsed a
motivation model as one method for finding same-sex harassment to be based on
sex, giving the example of a female employee who harasses other female
employees "in such sex-specific and derogatory terms ... as to make it clear that
the harasser 2is2 motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace." 1
218. The attraction model also could be called a motivation model, since it views the harassment as
premised on the harasser's erotic motivation. However, under the attraction model, the erotic motivation
is established by the combination of the harasser's (presumed) sexual orientation and the sexual conduct
itself. In the motivation model, discussed in this section, the harasser's intent to discriminate must be
proven, and is not established by the conduct itself. Although it is not clear exactly what kind of
discriminatory intent this model would require, in the equal protection context, discriminatory intent has
been interpreted to mean that the actor engaged in a particular act "because of," not "in spite of," the sex
of the persons harmed. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory purpose'. . . implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.").
219. See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 760 (2d Cir. 1998)
(upholding jury verdict against the plaintiff where "the jury could have found that even if the harassment
had occurred, it was not based on sex due to the age of plaintiff's male peers," and suggesting that "even
physical conduct of a sexual nature, when perpetrated by young children, is not necessarily based on the
harassee's sex"); Does 1, 2, 3 and 4 v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264, 1280-81 (M.D.
Ala. 1997) (suggesting that where students were sexually harassed by peers for having been molested by
a teacher, sufficient question of fact existed as to whether peers "were simply acting out of childish
cruelty or whether the plaintiffs' sex was the but-for cause of the harassment");Burrow v. Postville
Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1206 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding sexually explicit harassment
of female student by male and female students, triggered by plaintiff's reporting of property damage
caused by other students, "arguably went beyond harassing her for 'betraying' certain students," but it
was for the jury to decide whether the harassment was based on sex). But see Wright v. Mason City
Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (assuming that sexually explicit harassment
of female student by other female students was sexual harassment, even though the harassment was
motivated by a desire to retaliate against the plaintiff for pressing charges against her ex-boyfriend for
rape).
220. Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,047 & n.12 (discussing example where
supervisor harasses husband and wife in gender-specific terms, stating that "[in both cases, according to
the court, the remarks were gender-driven in that they were made with an intent to demean each member
of the couple because of his or her respective sex").
221. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). The intent standard endorsed
by the court in this example is much more limited than that suggested in the Title IX decisions and OCR
Guidance mentioned above. In Oncale the court describes the relevant intent as a general hostility to the
members of the victim's sex, while the Title IX version would encompass an intent to harm certain
individuals because of their sex, while stopping short of an intent to harm all members of that sex. The
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This approach, like the others discussed above, is an incomplete and problematic explanation for why peer sexual harassment is based on sex. As an initial
matter, the harasser's intent may be impossible to ascertain, at least if the
objective is to discover a conscious intent.2 22 Many actors, including those who
harass, are unaware of their motivation.22 3 A harasser may not have any specific
intent at all, beyond engaging in the particular acts involved. Even in the
workplace, the search for the intent of the harasser is elusive at best.2 24 Harassers
may act out of ignorance or ingrained and internalized notions of power relations,
rather than a sex-based animus. The harassers in Oncale, for example, probably
had little awareness of the motivation for their actions. Since they identified
themselves as heterosexual, despite their sexual aggressions toward Mr. Oncale,
their actual motivations may have been deeply submerged in their subconscious
in order to reconcile their actions with their sexual identification.22 5 Because sex
discrimination law would have little meaning if it only applied to actors who
understood and consciously intended the sex-based implications of their actions,
Title VH law recognizes that the unaware harasser can still sexually harass.22 6
The theoretical grounding of sexual harassment based on the motivation of the
harasser is even more problematic in the education context. While an adult
harasser may have some awareness that he has consciously singled out persons of

latter meaning is more consistent with the scope of Title VII generally. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta,
400 U.S. 542 (1971) (rejecting employer's argument that Title VII reaches only discrimination that
disadvantages all members of one sex).
222. See generally Charles R. Lawrence II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (exploring the limits of a legal approach centered on
intentional discrimination and analyzing the cultural and psychological forces that hinder consciousness
of such an intent).
223. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 199 (arguing that male
harassers usually do not harass with an intent to injure the female sex, and that acts that oppress women
are typically well-meant); see also Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content Of Our Categories:A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1213-16
(1995) (discussing social science research demonstrating lack of awareness on the part of decisionmakers of the reasons or motives for their actions).
224. See The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment, supra note 123, at 1212 & n.225 (arguing
that while some workplace sexual harassment may involve self-aware harassers acting on a conscious
motive, other such behavior is a subconscious reflexive reaction to workplace and societal norms and
structures).
225. See Gregory M. Herek, Beyond "Homophobia": A Social PsychologicalPerspective on Attitudes
TowardLesbians and Gay Men, 10 J. HoMosExuALITY 1, 10 (1984) (stating that hostility toward gay men
and lesbians may stem from unconscious conflicts in an individual's own gender identity).
226. See, e.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1999) ("We generally
presume that sexual advances of the kind alleged in this case are sex-based, whether the motivation is
desire or hatred."); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[t]he reasonable
victim standard we adopt today classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do
not realize that their conduct creates a hostile working environment."); cf The New Jurisprudence of
Sexual Harassment,supra note 123, at 1196-1205 (arguing that while Title VII law should not turn on the
harasser's intent, scholars should examine it as part of the gender dynamics that animate the harassment);
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supranote 74, at 114 (asking "[w]hy should unconsciousness
of its sexism exempt a practice, when unconsciousness that it is women who are damaged is integral to
the easy disregard that has so long sanctioned women's oppressions?").
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one sex for treatment that he would not impose on a person of the other sex, a
younger person may not know why she targets a particular person for harassment.
Children and younger adults may act out ingrained notions of sexuality and
gender expectations without any conscious intent to treat persons differently
based on their sex.22 7 Limiting the search for discrimination to a search for
would effectively immunize peer
animus or an intent to discriminate based on sex
2 28
IX.
Title
of
reach
the
from
harassment
sexual
Like other students who harass their peers, students who engage in harassment
that could be characterized as anti-gay may not know why they are singling out
the target. 229 The students who dish out anti-gay taunts and epithets on a daily
basis may not be able to articulate why they have selected a particular victim for
abuse, or what indicia of non-conformity in the victim's appearance or behavior
marked that person for harassment. Even where the harassers single out a student
who is openly gay, and intend to harass that person because of his sexual
orientation, they may be unaware of the sex-based components that also animate
the harassment.23 ° Categorizing such harassment as based on sexual orientation,
and not based on sex, merely because the harasser did not intend (consciously) to
target the victim based on her sex, again misses much of the picture.
In addition to the problem of discovering intent, regardless of whether an
intent to discriminate is present, the harm that results from the harassment often
does not depend on the harasser's intent. 23 1 For example, when G.F., the harasser
in Davis, behaved in a sexually abusive manner towards LaShonda, the harms
inflicted on her did not depend on his intent. Whatever his intent, his actions had
the effect of causing LaShonda to experience shame, depression and humiliation,
and to fear for her safety. The desire to limit sexual harassment among students,
especially young students, to only those situations where the harasser knew what
he was doing and intended to act in a sexually discriminatory manner seems to
stem from a reluctance to punish innocent children as if they were adults and to
227. See, e.g., Elissa L. Perry, et. al. Propensity To Sexually Harass: An Exploration of Gender
Difference, 38 SEx ROLES 443, 445 (1998) (citing previous research finding that the propensity to
sexually harass is based on a "cognitive association between social dominance and sexuality which
results from early socialization experiences").
228. Students are unlikely to consciously select their targets and engage in harassment out of a
sex-based animus. See Bruce Roscoe et. al., Sexual Harassment: Early Adolescents' Self-Reports of
Experiences and Acceptance, 29 ADOLESCENCE 515, 521 (1994) (listing reasons given by students for
sexually harassing their peers: "peer pressure; it is fun; to get the victim's attention; everyone does it;
have seen others do it; do not recognize the behavior as unwelcome and/or illegal; do not know other
ways to show people of the opposite sex that they are interested in them; the entire area of sexuality is
new and unfamiliar to them").
229. Richard A. Friend, Choices, Not Closets: Heterosexism and Homophobia in Schools, in BEYOND
SILENCED VOICES: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN UNITED STATES SCHOOLS 209, 211 (Lois Weiss &
Michelle Fine, eds. 1993) (describing the deep embeddedness of homophobia in school culture).
230. See discussion infra at Part IV B.
23 1. Cf. The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment,supra note 123, at 1211-12 & n.225 (arguing
that it is not the harasser's motivation that is central to the reinforcement of male norms, but his assertion
of his authority to express himself sexually without considering the harm to the target and her existence as
an independent agent).
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label them sexual harassers.2 32 However legitimate such concerns may be, they
do notjustify limiting peer sexual harassment to instances where a discriminatory intent
can be demonstrated on the part of the harasser. If the challenged conduct otherwise
meets the legal elements of sexual harassment, such that it is unwelcome, severe,
pervasive, objectively offensive, and based on sex,233 the harasser's age and intent
should be taken into account by school officials in formulating a reasonable response; it
should not erase the recognition that sexual harassment has occurred.
Making a discriminatory motive the touchstone of a peer sexual harassment
claim would have the consequence of heightening the resistance to recognizing
and responding to sexual harassment in the first place. If the inquiry into whether
sexual harassment has occurred is a quest for an ill-meaning actor with a
•discriminatory motive, schools, courts, and the Office for Civil Rights will be less
likely to identify sexual harassment as such, out of a reluctance to attribute
discriminatory motives to student-harassers.2 34 If sexual harassment as a legal
category is limited to self-conscious chauvinists seeking to harm women, as
opposed to persons acting out ingrained stereotypes and cultural gender expectations, the victims of peer sexual harassment will have little recourse under the
law.

235

Grounding sexual harassment law on the intent of the harasser makes for an
incomplete understanding of the scope and nature of harassment that is based on
sex. Because so much sexism and gender role expectations are internalized and
ingrained in individual belief systems, limiting sexual harassment law to those
cases where a harasser's conscious intent to discriminate can be proven would
frustrate the law's capacity to protect victims against some of the most damaging
and pervasive sexual harassment and abuse.
IV. A

BETI'ER ALTERNATIVE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS SEX-STEREOTYPING
AND THE POLICING OF GENDER ROLES

While each of the above theories may be useful in certain cases to establish the
basis for treating peer sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimina232. For example, the public outcry over the one day suspension of six year old Jonathan Prevette for
kissing his classmate on the cheek prompted the school district to revise its sexual harassment policy to
state that its "[sltudent-to-student sexual harassment policy shall not be applied in the case of young
students unless it clearly appears that there is an intent on the part of the students to engage in harassment
of a sexual nature." Kiss Leads to a Policy Revision, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996, at B9. A better course for
the district would have been to revise its policy to clarify that the kiss did not rise to the level of
unwelcome, severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive conduct, and that age-appropriate measures
should be taken where sexual harassment has occurred.
233. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1675 (1999).
234. See Krieger, supra note 223, at 1167 (criticizing Title VII disparate treatment law for focusing on
discriminatory motivation, stating that "there is no discrimination without an invidiously motivated
actor" or "villain"); Lawrence, supra note 222, at 324-27 (describing cultural resistance to identifying
discrimination where discrimination requires a finding of animus).
235. Cf Sharon Toffey Shepela & Laurie L. Levesque, Poisoned Waters: Sexual Harassmentand the
College Climate, 38 SEx ROLEs 589 (1998) (attributing the reluctance of students to label offensive
behavior as sexual harassment to the social norms that legitimate such behavior and its very prevalence).
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tion, 236 they are incomplete and not well-suited to much peer sexual harassment
in schools. They also fail to recognize anti-gay harassment as a form of sex-based
harassment, viewing it as an alternative to, rather than a form of, harassment
based on sex.
A better theory for addressing many forms of peer sexual harassment, including anti-gay harassment, would view the harassment as sex-stereotyped behavior
that polices and reinforces male and female gender roles. The Supreme Court
recognized gender role policing as a form of sex discrimination in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.23 7 In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was a
candidate for a partnership in the predominantly male Price Waterhouse firm, but
did not make partner based in part on her failure to conform to traditional,
gendered expectations about women.23 8 Comments by partners denying her
partnership reflected the widespread perception that she was too macho, not lady
like, too aggressive, and in need of "charm school" and instruction in make-up
application.2 39 In short, the partnership perceived her as insufficiently feminine.
The Court, in a plurality opinion, found that the partners impermissibly relied on
sex-stereotyping in deciding not to admit Ann Hopkins to the partnership.2 4 °
The Court faulted the firm for "stereotypical notions about women's proper
deportment," and for requiring female partners to match the gender stereotype
associated with their sex. 2 4 ' As Justice Brennan stated for a plurality of the Court,
"we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming24 2or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their
group."

236. Kathryn Abrams has pointed out that sexual harassment may assume many forms, including:
consciously trying to exclude women from male-dominated institutions; more subtle preservation of
male control (focusing on women's sexuality and requiring conformity to female stereotypes); disciplining women (and men) perceived as departing from stereotyped gender roles or threatening "masculine"
culture; and treating women as sexual objects in a way that makes clear that women lack control or
influence in the environment. The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment,supra note 123, at 1205-17.
Thus, she concludes, it is important for feminists to embrace a multi-faceted approach to sexual
harassment that has room for all of the different nuances and dimensions that this form of discrimination
may involve. Id. at 1230. 1agree generally with this approach and present the gender-role policing theory
discussed here as a preferable approach in many cases, although not necessarily a complete substitute for,
the models criticized above.
237. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
238. Id. at 231-32, 258.
239. Id. at 235-37. This reaction to women perceived as defying sex stereotypes is not as uncommon
as one might hope. See Julie Cart, Lesbian Issue Stirs Discussion; Women's Sports: Fear and
DiscriminationAre Common as Players Deal with a Perception of Homosexuality, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1992, at CI (quoting Mariah Burton Nelson on the lengths to which female athletes must go to counter
the perception of lesbianism: "one of the first things she and her teammates were told to do when they
were hired by the L.A. Dreams, a short-lived pro team, was to attend charm school. Other teams had
mandatory makeup sessions before all home games").
240. Id. at 258.
241. Id. at 256.
242. Id. at 251. A narrower reading of the Price Waterhouse decision would be that rather than
viewing employment decisions that are based on sex stereotyping as sex discrimination per se, the Court
faulted the firm for applying different criteria for partnership to men than it did to women. Under this
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The Court's recognition of sex steretyping and gender role policing as a form
of sex discrimination should serve as a basis for analyzing sexual harassment as a
harm that occurs because of sex. 243 Recent scholarship on sexual harassment
demonstrates the power of sexual harassment to police gender roles and reinforce
existing gender hierarchies in the workforce. 24 Peer sexual harassment in
schools also supports the sexual subordination of girls and women through the
policing and reinforcement of gender roles and sex stereotypes. Students can be
the cruelest of the gender police. Gender role conformity is particularly important
as a source of security and confidence in childhood and adolescence. 4 Students,
perhaps even more so than adults, learn the social meaning of sex, and its
attendant gender roles and sexual identity, from their interactions with their peers.
Peer sexual harassment polices those boundaries by enforcing the gender role
expectations that follow from a student's sex.
A.

GENDER STEREOTYPING AND ROLE POLICING IN PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT GENERALLY

The role-policing and reinforcement function of peer sexual harassment
operates both to punish gender outliers-persons perceived as transgressing the
expected roles assigned to their sex-and to reinforce the boundaries of gender
view, the firm veered off track by requiring aggressiveness for all potential partners, but penalizing
women (and not men) for being too aggressive (e.g., aggressive men could succeed, but aggressive
women could not; non-aggressive persons, male and female, could not succeed). Id. at 251 (stating that
the firm created a "Catch 22" for women). Under this reading, Price Waterhouse would not necessarily
discriminate on the basis of sex if it penalized both men and women who did not conform to their gender
roles, as long as both men and women who did conform had the same chance to succeed. However, the
facts of the case suggest the broader reading. The firm did have some (although few) female partners,
suggesting that women who were less aggressive, or who compensated for their aggressiveness by
conforming to gender stereotypes in other ways, could succeed at the firm. Thus, it violated Title VII not
because it kept women but not men from making partner, but because it required women (and perhaps
men as well) to conform to stereotyped gender roles in order to become partner.
243. The Court started down this path much earlier in its treatment of the old "sex-plus" cases. The
Court first recognized that discrimination for failure to satisfy the gender role expectations associated
with sex is a form of sex discrimination in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971)
(striking down rule excluding women, but not men, with young children from certain jobs). In Phillips,
the Court implicitly recognized the linkage of sex and gender role expectations as sex discrimination, and
that the challenged discrimination need not be directed towards all women to be unlawful; rather,
plaintiffs can prove discrimination by showing that a subgroup of women who do not conform to
expected sex roles are treated differently from men. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that
"ancient canards about the proper role of women" should not be a basis for discrimination under Title
VII).
244. See The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment, supra note 123, at 1220 (describing sexual
harassment as enforcing sex and gender hierarchies in the workplace by perpetuating male control and
furthering masculine norms); Gender Sex, Agency and Discrimination,supra note 123, at 1246 (noting
the similarity between Abram's approach and her own theory of sexual harassment as policing
hetero-patriarchal gender norms in the workplace, but differing from Abrams insofar as Abrams suggests
that male control is furthered only by subordinating women, as opposed to the gender-role policing of
both men and women).
245. Cf. SUZANNE PHARm, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 8 (1988) (noting that sex role
expectations "come crashing down on" girls and boys when they hit puberty).
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by bolstering the sex stereotypes associated with maleness and femaleness (not
limited to gender outliers). Thus, peer sexual harassment strengthens sex stereotypes and gender roles by punishing individuals who challenge or deviate from
them, and by acting out and further entrenching sex stereotypes and dichotomized male and female gender roles.
Much peer sexual harassment punishes departures from gender roles by
targeting persons who challenge sex-stereotyped roles for unwelcome harassment. Like the discrimination in Price Waterhouse, which punished Ann Hopkins
for not conforming to sex-stereotyped behavior, peer sexual harassment that
punishes people who depart from sex-stereotyped roles discriminates on the basis
of sex. This type of role policing is not limited to females; males who challenge
"masculine" gender roles are also at risk. Moreover, the policing of gender
non-conformity can be accomplished by both male and female harassers.24 6
The harassment at issue in Wright v. Mason City Community School Districtis
an example of how peer harassment can be used to police gender role nonconformity. 24 7 In that case, after reporting to police that she had been raped by
her former boyfriend in junior high school, a female student was subjected to
relentless sexual harassment by a group of students at school, most of whom were
female.24 8 She was called "whore," "bitch" and "slut," subjected to humiliating
graffiti and physically accosted.2 49 In addition to harassing the female student
who reported the rape, the students also harassed a male student "who had the
courage and compassion to take the plaintiff to the prom." 250 The female student
sued the school under Title IX for failing to take corrective action in response to
the harassment. 25 ' Although the male student did not join the case, both students
could be viewed as victims of gender-role policing. Both the female student who
reported the rape, and the male student who supported her, challenged the sexual
subordination of women.
The social meaning of gender, and the constraints imposed by gender roles, set
limits on how both men and women are expected to respond to the sexual
subordination of women. Women and girls who resist sexual exploitation, and

246. See Fineran & Bennett, supra note 104, at 629 ("[P]eer sexual harassment is an instrument that
creates and maintains male gender hierarchy. However, we do not assume that maintenance of male
gender hierarchy is entirely the work of men and boys; girls and women also may support male
dominance.") (citations omitted); see also id. at 632 ("[T]he more that boys and girls endorse beliefs that
men should be dominant, the more they report using sexual harassment with peers.").
247. Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
248. Id. at 1414.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded $5,200. See id. However, the court set
aside the jury's verdict, finding that although the harassment itself was based on sex, the plaintiff failed to
show that the school district's lack of sufficient response to the harassment stemmed from an intent to
discriminate against the plaintiff based on her sex. See id. at 1420. This ruling, issued before the Court
decided Davis, is inconsistent with the Davis decision, which held that a plaintiff need not demonstrate
that the school intended to treat harassment complainants differently on the basis of sex. See supra at
Part I B.
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have the temerity to complain about sexual harassment and rape, defy stereotypes
of women as compliant with male sexual demands.2 52 The threat to social norms
when a female does not remain passive in the face of male sexual aggression is
particularly acute where the assertion of female autonomy questions the sexual
prerogatives of a woman's boyfriend or spouse.25 3 Thus, when the plaintiff in
Wright pressed charges against her ex-boyfriend for rape, she became the target
of an abusive campaign to punish her for her transgression. Males who challenge
the sexual subordination of women also defy social norms of masculinity. Males
who question, or simply refuse to participate in, the sexual dominance of women
challenge ingrained notions of what it means to be male. 5 4 A male student who
supports a young woman for reporting a rape by an ex-boyfriend, and refuses to
join in on the harassment of her, may himself be subjected to harassment for
questioning the norms of male dominance and sexual ownership.
The fact that both sexes may be subjected to harassment that functions as
gender-role policing does not mean that the harassment itself is not based on sex.
Stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women can harm and constrain
both males and females. In other contexts, sex discrimination law has recognized
that a practice that subjects both men and women to sex-stereotypes discriminates on the basis of sex. For example, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., the Court
struck down the state's use of sex-based peremptory challenges to strike men
from the jury in an action seeking to establish paternity and determine child
support.25 5 The state's use of sex stereotypes to strike men from the jury went
hand in hand with the defendant's use of sex stereotypes to strike women from the
256
jury. 6 Under the Court's rationale, both the male and female jurors who were
struck had suffered discrimination from the litigants' use of stereotypes about the
252. See Shepela & Levesque, supra note 235, at 604 (asserting that the socialization of women to
accept non-consensual and offensive sexual interactions with men, and predominant sexual norms that
privilege male initiation of sexual activity, help explain the reluctance of female students to label certain
conduct as sexual harassment); see also SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at
45-46 ("Something fundamental to male identity feels involved in at least the appearance of female
compliance, something that is deeply threatened by confrontation with a woman's real resistance,
however subtly communicated.").
253. The resistance to full protection from marital rape and "date rape" reflects a social norm
legitimizing male sexual access to their female partners. See Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital
Rape Exemption and the FourteenthAmendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1270-71 (1986) (arguing that
the marital rape exemption is premised on traditional notions of women as the sexual property of their
husbands); Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 663, 674 n.55 (1999) (describing
research identifying a correlation between the tendency to blame victims of date rape and the acceptance
of sex-role stereotypes).
254. See, e.g., Bruce Kyle, U.S. Culture Blamed for Girls' Despair,BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 18,
1995 at B 1 (quoting psychologist Mary Pipher, author of Reviving Ophelia, as stating, "[b]oys are being
taught they'll be more popular if they harass girls, unaggressive boys [are] labeled as gay"). Cf. Feminist
Constructionsof Objectivity, supra note 68, at 127-28 (describing Title VII case in which mle employee
was harassed by male co-workers "because he did not conform to the men's image of male heterosexuality," in that he was unusually sensitive to sexual comments and objected to comments depicting women
as sex objects).
255. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
256. Id. at 129.
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proper roles and abilities of men and women. a57 Likewise, harassment that
punishes both men and women for transgressions from socially constructed
gender roles discriminates on the basis of sex.
An analogy to racial harassment further demonstrates the capacity for stereotypes to disadvantage more than one group of people, with the result that
discrimination is intensified, rather than neutralized. Imagine a work or school
environment in which racial harassment targets several persons of different races
for challenging their respective "racial roles." For example, a group of employees might target African American employees viewed as "uppity" and seeking
positions of power, and at the same time harass white employees who challenge
the social expectations associated with their race-perhaps by socializing with
African Americans or expressing sympathy for causes identified with racial
minorities. Both types of harassment would target persons who are perceived as
not conforming to racial stereotypes of socially appropriate behavior.25 8 Thus,
both racial and sexual harassment can police the social norms that regulate race
and gender by simultaneously targeting persons within dominant and subordinate
groups who defy the expectations associated with their group status.2 59
A gender role policing theory for peer sexual harassment is not limited to
punishing persons who deviate in some respect from stereotyped notions of
257. Id. at 141-42 ("All persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not to
be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and
reinforce patterns of historical discrimination."); see also Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 147 (1980) (striking down state workers compensation law paying death benefits to a worker's wife,
but requiring a worker's husband to prove dependency in order to qualify for benefits, as discrimination
against female workers who are denied spousal benefts); id. at 154-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reaching
the same result, but viewing the issue as discrimination against male spouses).
258. Although courts do not typically view race discrimination as premised on notions of traditional
roles, Catharine MacKinnon has pointed out an exception to this, noting that the old miscegenation cases
focused on the different social roles assigned by race. She notes that the district court judge in Loving v.
Virginia justified Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute on the grounds that:
"Almighty God created the races, white, black, yellow, Malay and red, and He placed them on
separate continents. And but for the interference with His arrangement there would be no cause
for such marriages." (citation omitted)
Sexual Harassmentof Working Women, supra note 74, at 136. In striking down Virginia's statute, the
Supreme Court effectively recognized the policing of racial roles as straightforward race discrimination.
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir.
1971) (segregation of clients by national origin created a racially hostile work environment for employee
with a Spanish surname).
259. That we speak of gender roles, but not racial roles, may reflect society's general (if far from
complete) recognition that in the context of race, the prescription of racially appropriate roles is itself
based on racism and racial bias. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 138 ("It
seems to have been decided that it is enlightened for blacks and whites to exchange social roles, but
unseemly for the sexes to do so."). A parallel recognition in the context of sex has been complicated by
the tendency to attribute gender role conformity to men's and women's different abilities or choices. See
id at 136-37; cf Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 68, at 117 & n. 112 (exploring how
"conventional wisdom" treats sexual and racial harassment differently, and noting that while the
traditional view "naturalized" and "rationalized" sexual harassment based on biological differences, it
did not accept such a justification for racial discrimination, although it did limit it to blatantly racist
behavior and excluded more subtle forms of racism).
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masculinity and femininity. Sexual harassment also may police sex role boundaries by acting out sex stereotypes directly, regardless of whether the victims are
perceived as conforming to or deviating from sex stereotyped roles. For example,
if Price Waterhouse had required those women in the partnership who had been
perceived as sufficiently "feminine" to make partner to conform to sex stereotyped roles, requiring them to get coffee, wear skirts, or act submissively toward
male colleagues and clients, these requirements also would have discriminated
based on sex.
Much male-female peer sexual harassment in schools involves sex-stereotyped
conduct that reinforces conventional constructions of male and female sexuality.
When male students sexually harass female students, they solidify sexual
stereotypes and gender roles. The sexuality of the harassed student--or, more
accurately, the sexuality of the harassed student as it is constructed by the
harasser-becomes the most salient characteristic to the harasser, to the exclusion of the rest of her qualities as an individual. 26 0 The harasser's conduct reflects
and reinforces a sex-stereotyped view of women as passive, receptive to male
advances, and lacking independent agency. 26' At the same time, peer sexual
harassment by males constructs the sexuality of the harasser based on sexstereotyped roles of male dominance and aggression.26 2
The Davis case is a good example of how male-female sexual harassment
reinforces sex stereotyped gender roles. The harasser in Davis, known as G.F.,
accosted LaShonda with a barrage of public sexual harassment and abuse.26 3 He
made comments about her breasts, told her in graphic terms what he planned to
do to her sexually, groped her breasts and genital area, and generally treated her
as a sexual object. 264 Through the harassment, G.F. acted out stereotypical
dichotomous male and female gender roles. In the very assertion of G.F.'s right to
subject LaShonda to his sexual impulses, he robbed her of her autonomy and her
agency as a self-directed being. At the same time, he reaffirmed his own
"masculinity" through his very acts of harassment. The conduct was sex-

260. See Feminist Constructions of Objectivity, supra note 68, at 116 (describing Dr. Susan Fiske's
testimony in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards as "stress[ing] that issues of sexuality form an important
component of gender stereotyping," in that "[flemale sexuality, as constructed by men, becomes
women's salient attribute, to the exclusion of other characteristics. Women become judged in sexual
terms, and anger directed toward women often takes on a sexual dimension.").
261. See, e.g., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 156 (discussing the
influence of sex stereotypes on male and female sex roles, with the male sex role socially constructed to
be "strong, aggressive, tough, dominant and competitive," and the social conditioning of the female sex
role to "passivity, gentleness, submissiveness, and receptivity to male initiation, particularly in sexual
contact").
262. See Gender Sex, Agency and Discrimination, supra note 123, at 1251-53 (emphasizing the
reflexive and performative power of sexual harassment, including the reinforcement of heteromasculinity in the harasser); SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 178 (stating
that "what men learn makes-them 'a man' is sexual conquest of women; in turn, women's femininity is
defined in terms of acquiescence to male sexual advances").
263. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1666-67 (1999).
264. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667.
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stereotyped in that it was based on the socially ingrained role of the female as
sexual object and the male as sexual actor.26 5
Lessons learned by female victims of sexual harassment include hopelessness,
resignation, and passivity in accepting the conventional subordinate female role
of sexual object. The voices of girls and young women who have been subjected
to sexual harassment from their peers reflect these lessons in the sexual subordination of women to men and the limits imposed by gender:
It made me feel cheap, like I was doing something I wasn't aware of to
draw this kind of attention to myself. I could never stand up to him
because [if] I told him to stop he'd threaten me, so I began to act like it
didn't bother me(.) ... He'd hit me (hard enough to bruise me twice)
and then pin my arms behind my back till it hurt and push [me] against
hit
a wall and tell me all the awful things he would do to me if I ever 266
Michigan]
old,
year
[14
again.
him
to
up
standing
quit
I
so
him again,
At first I didn't really think of it because it was considered a 'guy
thing', but as the year went on, I started to regret going to school,
especially my locker, because I knew if I went I was going to be
cornered and be touched, or had [sic] some comment blurted out at me.
defenseless and there was nothing I
I just felt really out of place and 267
could do. [14 year old, Maryland]
I've been sexually harassed for almost three years now, and it really
hurts me, and it makes me feel like I'm a bad person, or that I'm no
good and deserve what I get. One guy kept trying to feel me up and go
down my pants in class. He'd also rub his leg up and down my leg and I
hated it. He'd also ask me to have sex with him... I really felt low and
he called me a slut and a bitch when I said 'NO'. It shouldn't be
you down mentally
happening to anyone, it breaks your soul and brings
26
8
Hampshire]
New
old,
year
14
[
physically.
and
First of all, let me say that being sexually harassed since fifth grade
has gone beyond the damage of affecting the way I feel... Now, at age
15 and a sophomore in high school, I have no pride, no self-confidence
and still no way out of the hell I am put through in my school.... I
like I
have been depressingly desperate for something to make me feel
269
actually am not a slutty bitchy whore. [14 year old, Alabama]
•... Now sexual harassment doesn't bother me as much because it
happens so much it almost seems normal. I know that sounds awful, but
the longer it goes on without anyone doing anything, the more I think
265. Shepela & Levesque, supra note 235, at 604 (discussing predominant social norms of male and
female sexual roles and the reinforcement of these norms through sexual harassment).
266. NOW LDEF Amicus Brief, Davis, supra note 88, at *9 (quoting from INCIDENCE OF SEXUAL
HARASsMENT, supra note 88, at 11).
267. Id.
268. SECRETS IN PUBLIC, supra note 87 at 3-4.
269. Id. at 7-8.
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of it as just one of270
those things that I have to put up with. [14 year old,
Washington state]

These lessons in female passivity and subordination are especially effective
when schools respond to the harassment with indifference and inattention. A
gender policing theory best captures the involvement of schools in contributing
to the discrimination. When schools respond to peer sexual harassment by
belittling the harm that results from sexual harassment, or minimizing the
wrongfulness of the conduct, they add to the gender role policing effects of the
harassment itself.27 ' The school's deliberate indifference to the harassment thus
contributes to impact of the underlying harassment.
B.

GENDER STEREOTYPING AND ROLE POLICING IN ANTI-GAY HARASSMENT

Like peer sexual harassment that polices gender nonconformity and reinforces
sex-stereotyped roles, anti-gay harassment also discriminates on the basis of sex
under a gender policing framework. Harassment based on sex and harassment
based on sexual orientation are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.27 2 The
recognition that anti-gay harassment is also based on sex has been obscured by
the law's insistence on viewing sex and sexual orientation discrimination as
mutually exclusive categories.2 7 3 In fact, however, the connection between
harassment based on sex and that based on sexual orientation is twofold: sexism
and sex-stereotyping provide the foundation for anti-gay harassment, and antigay harassment serves to police and enforce sexism and sex-stereotyped gender roles.
Anti-gay harassment is largely predicated on hostility toward perceived
274
transgressions of gender roles, and is thus a form of sex discrimination.
270. NOW LDEF Amicus Brief, Davis, supra note 88, at * 19 (quoting from INCIDENCE OF SEXUAL
HARAssMENT,supra note 88, at 11).
271. SECRETS IN PUBLIC, supra note 87, at 15 (arguing that schools' failure to respond to peer sexual
harassment "teaches young women to suffer harassment and abuse privately. They learn that speaking up
will not result in their being heard or believed and that if they insist on pursuing matters, they will be on
their own."); NOW LDEF Amicus Brief, Davis, supra note 88, at * 15 (citing finding of Connecticut
study that "85 percent of school personnel who monitor Title IX compliance agree that 'student to
student sexual harassment often goes unrecognized because it is too often dismissed as normal adolescent
behavior' " (quoting Permanent Commission on the Status of Women et. al, In Our Own Backyard:
Sexual Harassment in Connecticut's Public High Schools 21 n.7, 31 (1995))).
272. See What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,supra note 140, at 760, 763-66 (applying theory of
heteropatriarchy to explain why and how sexual harassment constructs male and female identities);
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender,"and "Sexual Orientation"in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL.L. REv. 3, 6-8 (1995)
(discussing current system of "heteropatriarchy" which conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation, and
results in mutually reinforcing and interrelated oppressions across each of these dimensions).
273. See supra note 119, 120 and accompayning text.
274. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 187 (1988) (arguing that anti-gay hostility is a reaction to homosexuality's challenge to traditional
gender roles); see also Gregory M. Herek, On HeterosexualMasculinity: Some Physical Consequences
of the Social Construction of Gender and Sexuality, 29 AM. BEHAV.SCI. 563, 565 (1986) (describing
social science findings that heterosexuals' negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians are consistently correlated with traditional views of gender and family roles).
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Homosexuality challenges the social construction of gender, in which masculinity and femininity are defined as opposite (as in the "opposite sex") and
complementary.2 75 It also challenges social relationships structured on male
dominance and female dependence. 27 6
Students, in particular, are targeted for anti-gay harassment when they are
perceived to depart from appropriate gender roles.27 7 The connection between
gender stereotyping and anti-gay harassment is especially evident where the
harasser assumes, without knowing, that the target is gay or lesbian. In such
cases, the harasser often uses other markings of gender role non-conformity to
select the target.27 8 Where the harasser targets a male student perceived to be
effeminate, for example, the harassment is based on the male student's sex
because his9 sex created the expectation of a more stereotypically masculine
personae.

27

Even in those cases where the harasser selects a target who is openly gay or
lesbian and does not otherwise depart from sex-stereotyped expectations, antigay harassment is also based on the target's sex, in addition to her sexual

275. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 800 (1989) (stating that
"it is difficult to separate our society's inculcation of a heterosexual identity from the simultaneous
inculcation of a dichotomized complementarity of roles to be borne by men and women").
276. See Law, supra note 274, at 219-21 (arguing that gay and lesbian relationships threaten the
traditional, gender hierarchy based on male-female relationships); Mark A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protectionfor Lesbians and Gay
Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511, 624-29 (1992) (arguing that lesbians threaten the established gender
order because they are thought to be claiming more power than they deserve as women, while gay men do
so because they are thought to be relinquishing power to which they are entitled as men).
277. See Friend, supra note 229, at 223 (stating that, "[i]t is not by accident that those who are most
frequently targeted [for anti-gay harassment and violence in school] are seen as violating expectations
about how women and men 'should be' or 'should act,' " and explaining how anti-gay harassment
reinforces conventional gender roles).
278. The Safe Schools Coalition study found that many students targeted for anti-gay harassment
were not openly gay or lesbian. Of the 148 students targeted, 92 were not known to be gay or lesbian by
the harasser(s). Of these, 38 had defended the civil rights of sexual minorities or had lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgendered (LGBT) friends; 31 "were apparently perceived to fit LGBT stereotypes (e.g.,
girls with short hair, a boy who was soft-spoken and who studied during free time)"; and 23 were targeted
"for no apparent reason." Safe Schools Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me:
UnderstandingAnti-Gay Harassmentand Violence in Schools, Executive Summary (Jan. 1999) <http://
www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5execsum.html>. See also Law, supra note 274, at 196 (summarizing
historic evidence demonstrating that "the censure of homosexuality cannot be animated merely by a
condemnation of sexual behavior," and that instead "homosexuality is censured because it violates the
prescriptions of gender role expectations"); Amicus Brief for Law Professors, at 15 n.12., Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568) [hereinafter Law Professors Amicus
Brief, Oncale] (arguing that the male-male harassment in Doe v. City of Belleville was "typical of many
same-sex harassment cases" in that the harassers "deployed homophobic epithets" without actually
believing that the target is gay).
279..Valdes, supra note 272, at 24-25 (arguing that punishing "femininity" in men perpetuates
male/female hierarchies and dichotomies); Law Professors Amicus Brief, Oncale, supra note 278, at 25
(arguing that male-male harassment is because of sex if the target is "singled out for harassment because
of his failure to live up to some standard of masculinity," or "because he objected to a hyper-masculine
environment" in an all-male workplace).
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orientation. 2 80 The departure from heterosexual norms itself represents a rejection of conventional gender roles.281 It is the target's sex that makes her attraction
to persons of the same sex unsettling and threatening to the harasser.282 The threat
that homosexuality presents to ingrained notions of gender roles is not lost on
students, even if they are not consciously aware of it. 283 Anti-gay harassment thus
serves to punish non-conformity with the gender role expectations designated by
the target's sex, much as Anne Hopkins was not admitted to the partnership
because she was not perceived as acting sufficiently lady-like.2 84
At the same time that sex stereotypes fuel anti-gay harassment, anti-gay
harassment itself polices and reinforces sex-stereotyped roles. Anti-gay harassment performs this function regardless of the sexual orientation of the target.
Persons who transgress gender roles in any respect-whether or not they identify
as gay or lesbian-may be subjected to anti-gay harassment as a means of
punishing and deterring gender role departures.
When men or women act in a manner that challenges gender norms, they risk
being labeled gay or lesbian, and subjected to harassment. Girls and women who
push the boundaries of traditional gender roles risk being targeted as lesbians
(regardless of their actual sexual orientation) and subjected to anti-gay harassment.28 5 The persistent harassment and lesbian-baiting of female athletes, whether

280. In the Safe Schools Coalition study, 34 of the 148 students targeted were openly gay or lesbian,
15 had come out privately to friends or family who told others, and five were "found out." Safe Schools
Coalition of Washington State, They Don't Even Know Me: UnderstandingAnti-Gay Harassment and
Violence in Schools, Executive Summary (Jan. 1999) <http://www.safeschools-wa.org/ss5execsum.html>.
281. See Valdes, supra note 272, at 293 (discussing the conflation of sex, gender and sexual
orientation, and summarizing the author's theory that sexual orientation discrimination is contingent and
derivative of sex and gender); Fajer, supra note 276, at 617-620 (discussing psychological literature
linking homophobia to concern with departures from gender role norms).
282. See Elvia R. Arriola, The Penaltiesfor Puppy Love: Institutionalized Violence Against Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered Youth, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 429, 448 (1998) (describing the
gender-socialization function of anti-gay peer harassment, and identifying the gender norms that it
embodies: "' [n]ormal' boys play sports, drink beer, and pursue girls, while 'normal' girls will pay more
attention to their looks in order to attract boys' attention").
283. See Pryor & Whalen, supra note 98, at 140 (citing findings of AAUW study that, in asking
respondents about their reaction to 14 types of sexual harassment, "[n]one provoked as strong a negative
reaction in boys as being called 'gay,' "and that 87% of girls reported "that they would be 'very upset' at
being accused of being lesbian").
284. The objection that sex discrimination law does not fit well with sexual orientation discrimination
because gays and lesbians face discrimination even when they are not recognized as "gender nonconformers,"-that is, where they act like "real men" and "real women," see Mary Eaton, At the
Intersection of Gender and Sexual Orientation: Toward a Lesbian Jurisprudence, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 183, 199-200 (1994)--gives too little weight to how threatening homosexuality is to the
system of sex subordination, and too little weight to how heavily sexual orientation affects the social
meaning of what is a "real" man and a "real" woman. See Law, supra note 274, at 196 (describing
culturally pervasive gender norms prescribing that "[rneal men are and should be sexually attracted to
women, and real women invite and enjoy that attraction"); Valdes, supra note 272, at 16-18 (arguing that
all acts of sexual orientation discrimination are necessarily based also on sex or gender or both).
285. See, e.g., Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in NontraditionalJob
Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 222-23
(1990) (describing lesbian-baiting of women in the military and the function it serves to police gender
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or not they are lesbians, exemplifies the interlocking nature of sex and sexual
resisting
orientation as a basis for harassment.2 86 For girls and women, even
287
lesbians.
as
them
labels
that
harassment
sexual harassment may incite
Likewise, boys and men who act in a manner considered inappropriate for their
gender-for example, by demonstrating an interest in traditionally "feminine"
subjects such as art, drama, cooking, or figure skating, or displaying a sensitivity
associated with femaleness-also risk being targeted as gay by their peers.
Indeed, some research suggests that males face even greater sanctions, in the
form of anti-gay harassment, when they depart from gender expectations. 2 88 For
to
males, merely choosing not to engage in harassment may signal a failure 289
homosexuality.
of
accusations
provoke
may
and
norms
conform to masculine
For both male and female students, anti-gay harassment reinforces sex stereotypes by enforcing the boundaries of the social roles assigned their sex.2 9 °
The dichotomy between sex and sexual orientation under sex discrimination
role boundaries); PHARR, supra note 245, at 24-26 (describing how the "lesbian" label deters women
from identifying as feminists and working for women's equality).
286. See, e.g., Leslie Heywood, Despite the Positive RhetoricAbout Women's Sports, FemaleAthletes
Face a Culture of Sexual Harassment, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1999, at B4 (stating that "old
assumptions that women who excel at sports are really more like men (and must, therefore, be lesbians,
because they're not conventionally feminine) are rearticulated in the kind of 'lesbian baiting' of female
coaches and athletes that happens on many campuses"); Julie Phillips, Intolerable: Does the Ben Wright
Saga Signal an End to the FightAgainst Homophobia in Women's Sports, or Just the Beginning?, 18
WOMEN'S SPORTS AND FITNESS 23 (1996) (quoting Michael Messner, Ph.D., sports sociologist at UCLA as
stating, "[o]ne of the ways women's sports have been policed, in the sense of not allowing them to
challenge men's power and authority, has been to associate women who are athletic with lesbianism");
Cate Terwiliger, Nike Ads Underlined Research Data, DENVER POST, Nov. 8, 1998, at F5 (citing 1993
Feminist Majority Foundation report finding that "'[a] common barrier [to girls and women in sports] is
the homophobic belief that female athletes are, or will become, lesbians,' " and that '" [this myth puts
pressure on girls and women to avoid activities perceived as 'masculine' for fear of facing harassment and
discrimination' "); Lori Riley et. al., Women's Progress in College Athletics, Part I1: The Lesbian Stigma,
HARFORD COuRANT, May 25, 1992, at B 1 (citing instances of anti-lesbian harassment of female athletes).
287. See Pryor & Whalen, supra note 98, at 140-41 (arguing that women who reject sexual advances
risk being targeted as lesbians); SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 74, at 51 (stating
that women who resist sexual harassment become targets for additional abuse, including accusations of
"prudery, unnaturalness, victorianism [a]nd lesbianism").
288. See Friend, supra note 229, at 223 (noting that male students, perhaps even more than female
students, face powerful consequences when they cross over the "gender line," and that this line can be
very tight, directing specific behaviors in terms of speech, dress, personality, sensitivity, and expression
of emotions); John G. Kerns & Mark A. Fine, The Relation Between Gender and Negative Attitudes
Toward Gay Men and Lesbians: Do GenderRole Attitudes Mediate This Relation?, 31 SEx ROLES 297,
304 (1994) (citing research suggesting that gay men are perceived as deviating more from traditional
gender roles than lesbians).
289. See supra note 254; See also Gregory M. Herek, On HeterosexualMasculinity: Some Physical
Consequences of the Social Construction of Gender and Sexuality, 29 AM. BEHAV. Sci., 563, 563-77
(1986) (arguing that to be a "man" in American society is to be homophobic, and that expressing hostility
toward homosexuals in general, and gay men specifically, enhances culturally constructed "masculine"
identity); The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment, supra note 123, at 1219 (stating that targeting
men perceived as "non-masculine" reinforces "masculinity" in the harasser at the same time that it
punishes departures from "masculinity" in the target).
290. See generallyPHARR, supra note 245, at 10-19 (explaining how condemnation of homosexuality
enforces traditional gender roles and serves as a "weapon" of sex discrimination).
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law threatens to undercut the effectiveness of the law by permitting the power of
homophobia to keep men and women in their respective "places." Courts would
have little difficulty recognizing that the straight girl who is harassed for being a
"tomboy," playing football, and not acting sufficiently "ladylike" is being
harassed because of her sex, whether or not the harassment takes an explicitly
sexual form. But if this girl is gay (or is perceived to be gay), and the harassment
also includes anti-gay taunts and epithets, or other indications of anti-gay
hostility, the "because of sex" criteria will be much more difficult to establish
under current law.29 ' Just as the absence of overt sexuality in gender role
reinforcement and policing should not make the conduct any less because of sex,
neither should the presence of anti-gay animus. If Anne Hopkins, in addition to
being penalized for her supposedly "macho" demeanor and her failure to wear
make-up, were also accused of being a lesbian, and subjected to anti-gay scorn,
the harassment would be more -not less-linked to and triggered by her sex,
which set the ground rules from which her departure from expected gender roles
was measured. Unless sex discrimination law is interpreted to reach anti-gay
harassment, the sexual orientation "loophole" will undercut the law's promise of
guaranteeing individuals opportunities without regard to their sex. 29 2
C. GENDER ROLE POLICING AS A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE IX

The theory proposed here would view much peer sexual harassment, including

anti-gay harassment, as premised on, and reinforcing of, sex-stereotyped views
about the proper gender roles of men and women and their relation to one
another.29 3 This theory would have several advantages compared to the prevailing explanations for why peer sexual harassment discriminates on the basis of
sex.
First, unlike a motivation framework, the harasser need not have any specific
intent to demean or harass the target because of their sex. Sex stereoptyping often

291. See supra discussion Part II.
292. Cf Valdes, supra note 272, at 25 (arguing that the law must reach sexual orientation discrimination in order to fulfill the commitment of sex discrimination law).
293. While attraction-based same-sex and female-male harassment may not fall within this theory,
such conduct could still be covered under the existing attraction analysis in cases where "but for" the
target's sex, the harassment would not have occurred. Although an attraction theory has severe limitations
in failing to encompass much peer sexual harassment in school, as explained above, it may nevertheless
retain some degree of usefulness in reaching attraction-based harassment that does not fit within other
paradigms. Cf. The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, supra note 123, at 1210, 1227-29
(acknowledging that some sexual harassment is about desire, and viewing male-male attraction-based
harassment as based on sex because, although it does not involve gender role policing of the target, it
nevertheless affirms the traditional male norms of the male as sexual subject who unilaterally imposes his
sexuality on the target, regardless of the target's desires or agency). But cf Gender Sex, Agency and
Discrimination, supra note 123, at 1255-56 (viewing "homosexual" advances by a harasser to a
same-sex target as outside the scope of sexual harassment law because not involving gender policing, and
preferring to encompass such conduct under a disparate treatment theory because of the dangers of an
attraction model in sexual harassment cases).
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operates at an unconscious level. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Court did
not require a showing that the partners who decided not to make Ann Hopkins a
partner were aware of the sex bias that shaped their decision.2 94 Likewise,
students who police and reinforce gender roles by harassing their peers may not
be aware of the sex-stereotypes that animate their behavior. Moreover, even
though the model does not require proof of a conscious intent or animus, it still
should fit within an intentional discrimination, as opposed to a disparate impact,
framework. Harassment that acts out or reinforces sex stereotypes begins with the
reference point of the target's sex. The harasser's conduct responds to ingrained
notions of maleness and femaleness, reinforcing and enforcing the boundaries of
gender. As in Price Waterhouse, evaluating or responding to the target in a
sex-stereotyped manner is a form of intentional discrimination under existing
legal frameworks.
Second, a gender policing model would recognize that sex-based harassment
can take non-sexual as well as sexual forms, and thus has the potential to reach a
broader range of conduct than the sexual-in-nature model. The gender policing
model also may have a better chance of grounding the harm of the harassment
without giving voice to traditional, protectionist notions of female sexuality. One
counter-argument in the comparison between the gender-policing and sexual-innature models is that the latter model is simpler to apply, and thus has the best
prospect for capturing a broader range of conduct than its alternatives. However,
the apparent simplicity of the sexuality model is not as great as it first appears.
The sexual-in-nature model does not apply itself; courts only pretend that it does,
and then make covert judgments about what they do and do not consider sexual.
To the extent that application of a gender-role-policing model may require further
elaboration for courts, that elaboration can be done through expert testimony on
the connection between sex stereotypes, gender role expectations and the
harassment. Where the connection is not apparent, factfinders would benefit from
expert testimony to shed light on how the behavior acts out, reinforces or polices
sex stereotypes of male and female roles. Such an education may be useful to
develop the law in manner that better captures the harm of the harassment.
Grounding peer sexual harassment on a gender-role policing foundation also
recognizes that both males and females can be subjected to sexual harassment,
even simultaneously. A school that knowingly permits the harassment of a male
student who takes home-economics and of a female student who takes automechanics discriminates against both of these students. Likewise, a school could
permit the sexual harassment of LaShonda Davis and the harassment of Jamie
Nabozny, and yet "cause" the discrimination (in the Davis sense) against both of
them by condoning sex-based harassment that reinforces sex stereotypes and
polices gender roles.
Despite these advantages, courts have yet to consider sex-stereotyping and
gender-role policing theories as a basis for grounding peer sexual harassment
294. 490 U.S. at 241-42.
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under Title IX. Unfortunately, some courts have resisted a gender-role policing
theory in Title VII cases, particularly where the plaintiff's gender non-conformity
is connected to perceptions of his sexual orientation.29 5 One prominent exception
to this resistance is the Seventh Circuit's pre-Oncale decision in Doe v. City of
Belleville.296 In City of Belleville, two brothers who were perceived to be
effeminate were harassed in a sexually explicit manner in an all-male workplace.
The district court found that because the harassers targeted the brothers out of a
belief that they were gay, the harassment was based on sexual orientation rather
than sex, and was therefore beyond the reach of Title VII.2 97 The Seventh Circuit
reversed, articulating two separate rationales. First, the court refused to treat
same-sex and cross-sex harassment differently, holding that when the harassment
has explicit sexual overtones, it is necessarily because of the victim's gender,
regardless of the sex of the harasser.2 98 Second, the court relied on the Price
Waterhouse decision to conclude that harassment for the failure to conform to
stereotyped gender roles is harassment because of sex. 2 9 9 The Supreme Court's
summary decision vacating and remanding the Seventh Circuit's decision "in
light of" Oncale, calls into question which, if any, portions of the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning remain valid after Oncale.3°

The Supreme Court's decision to vacate and remand in City of Belleville
should be interpreted as simply rejecting the Seventh Circuit's first ruling that
harassment of a sexual nature is always based on sex. This explanation of the
Court's action would leave open the possibility that sex stereotyping could serve
as a basis for the because of sex requirement in sexual harassment cases. This
interpretation is bolstered by the Seventh Circuit's own determination that the
in Oncale for proving that harassment is based on sex are not
methods identified
exhaustive. 3°
301
295. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 at *27-*29 (6th Cir. Jan. 15,
1992) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting male plaintiff's argument that anti-gay harassment was sexstereotyping and based on sex, and noting that plaintiff failed to show that a lesbian would have been
treated more favorably); Klein v. McGowan, 36 F. Supp. 2d 885, 889-90 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that
harassment based on the "sexual aspect of Plaintiff's personality," is not because of sex); Simonton v.
Runyon, 50 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that harassment because of sexual orientation
is not harassment because of sex); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73-76 (D.
Me. 1998) (finding harassment of male plaintiff to be based on his perceived sexual orientation and not
his sex, and refusing to view sexual orientation discrimination as a form of gender discrimination.). The
resistance to viewing anti-gay harassment as a form of sex discrimination is particularly difficult to
explain because such harassment meets the literal test of "but for" sex. If the target were otherwise
identical (having the same gender "markings" and being attracted to the same persons), but for his sex,
the harassment would not occur; a man who is'ostracized for being attracted to men would not experience
such harassment if he were a woman who is attracted to men.
296. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
297. Id. at 568.
298. Id. at 577-80.

299. Id. at 580-83.
300. 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
301. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e discern nothing
in the Supreme Court's decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be exhaustive
rather than instructive.").
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One court within the Seventh Circuit has explicitly adopted this approach,
ruling that Oncale does not foreclose the sex stereotyping theory adopted in City
of Belleville.3 ° z This court, in Spearman v. FordMotor Co., applied a gender role
policing theory to the harassment of a male employee who, because of "the way
he projected his gender," was perceived to be gay. 30 3 In doing so, the court cited
Price Waterhouse as standing for the proposition that "Title VII does not permit
an employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or behavior
does not conform to gender stereotypes. ' ' 3 1 While recognizing that the Seventh
Circuit "at present, has decided that discrimination based upon sexual orientation
is beyond the reach of Title VII," the court nevertheless ruled that sex and sexual
orientation are not mutually exclusive causes of harassment. 30 5 As the court stated:
Harassment can be motivated by many factors-sex as well as sexual
orientation-and just because one discriminatory motivation as of yet
is not recognized as impermissible under Title VII does not release the
employer from liability for-discrimination because of sex under Title
such
VII. Therefore, continuous comments by a harasser to a plaintiff,
30 6
as "fag," "dyke," "queer," could be covered under Title VII.
This approach would recognize anti-gay harassment as gender role policing that
violates sex discrimination law.
Another district court in the Seventh Circuit also has been receptive to a gender
policing theory for sexual harassment, although it found that such a theory did not
fit that particular case. In EEOC v. Trugreen Ltd. Partnership,the court ruled that
there was nothing in the record from which to infer that the plaintiff, who was a
born-again Christian and married to a woman, was subjected to the harassment
because of his gender, as opposed to his religious convictions or his personality.307 The court carefully surveyed Seventh Circuit precedent, including Doe v.
City of Belleville, and found that the record in the case before it did not
demonstrate sex stereotyping. In describing the plaintiff's argument that he was
targeted because he "did not exhibit his masculinity in a way that met [the
harasser's] conception of how a man should behave," the court stated:
Although plaintiff could succeed on such a theory, it cannot do so
without the facts to support the theory. It has failed to come forward

302. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-C-0452, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14852, at *18-*19
Sept. 1, 1999) ("This court finds that the reasoning in Doe is not inconsistent with Oncale and
(N.D. I1.
therefore Doe remains viable.").
303. Id. at *19, *21.
304. Id. at *19.
305. Id. at *22 n.4.
306. Id.
307. EEOC v. Trugreen Ltd. Partnership,No. 98-C-164-C, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9368 at *20-21

(W.D. Wisc. Mar. 23, 1999).
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with factual evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute that [the
harasser] treated [plaintiff] adversely because
[plaintiff's] conduct did
30 8
not conform to stereotypical gender roles.
After faulting plaintiff for his failure to identify specific evidence in the record, as
required by the court's summary judgment procedures, the court further stated
that:
There is no suggestion that [the harasser] used gender-specific, derogatory terms in response to [plaintiff's] aversion to sexually explicit
banter and photographs. [Plaintiff] does not contend that [the harasser]
called him a sissy or
a queer or otherwise questioned his masculinity or
30 9
sexual orientation.

In addition to these courts, one state court has applied a gender-policing theory
to sexual harassment under its state employment discrimination law. 310 In
Zalewski v. Overlook Hospital, a New Jersey court relied on Price Waterhouse to
recognize male-male sexual harassment as a form of sex stereotyping and gender
role policing.31' Inthat case, a male employee was harassed ina sexual manner
' 32
by his coworkers "because they believed him to be a virgin and effeminate. '
The court characterized the harassment as occurring "because [plaintiff] was a
male who did not behave as [the harassers] perceived a male should behave," and
ruled that such harassment was a form of gender stereotyping under the act.3 13
While itistoo soon to say that these courts represent the wave of the future
with respect to a gender policing approach to harassment, they certainly give
cause for optimism. Courts evaluating Title IX harassment claims may have even
better prospects for recognizing such a theory. Because no Title IX cases yet have
rejected such a theory, there is less precedential baggage to overcome in
recognizing sex stereotyping as a basis for peer harassment. In addition, there
may be reason to believe that gender policing plays a greater role in anti-gay
harassment that occurs in school, as sexual orientation is not a fixed construct
during childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood, such that anti-gay harassment during these life stages may have more to do with gender than homosexuality per se. 314 Finally, the pressures toward gender conformity may be particularly
acute during school years-perhaps even more so that in the adult workplace.
308. Id. at *23-24.
309. Id. at *26.
310. Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. Although the state law at issue prohibited discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived
sexual orientation, as well as discrimination based on sex, the court treated the claim as one of sex
discrimination because there was no suggestion that the plaintiff was anything but heterosexual. Id. at
132, 135-36.
314. See, e.g., Friend, supra note 229, at 220-21 (discussing inconsistencies in sexual behavior,
sexual orientation, and self-labeling during the formation of adolescent sexual identity).
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THE GENDER POLICE

While the relationship between anti-gay harassment in school and gender role
policing requires further investigation, a gender role policing model seems
particularly promising for evaluating peer harassment claims under Title IX. As
discussed above, much sexual harassment and anti-gay harassment in school
takes the form of punishing departures from, or reinforcing the boundaries of,
conventional gender roles. Title IX law should recognize this reality.
CONCLUSION

Sex discrimination law currently protects students from anti-gay peer harassment only if the school itself treated them worse than similarly situated persons
of the other sex, or possibly, in a determination by the Office for Civil Rights, if
the harassment took a form that was sexual in nature.315 Peer sexual harassment,
on the other hand, gives rise to legal liability if the school had notice of it, but
responded with deliberate indifference. The reason for the difference is that
courts and the OCR assume that peer sexual harassment occurs on the basis of the
target's sex, but that anti-gay harassment is based on sexual orientation and not
sex. This line in the sand dividing sex and sexual orientation is hazy at best. Only
an overly constrained and cryptic view of sex discrimination law supports such a
categorical distinction. Sex discrimination law is not limited to discrimination
that is based only on sex, and no other factor.3 16 Yet that is essentially the stance
that courts and the OCR have taken in refusing to recognize anti-gay harassment
as based on sex where the harassment targets persons who defy conventional
gender roles. This view severely limits the capacity of Title IX to provide
meaningful protection from sex discrimination.
The law's failure to recognize anti-gay peer harassment as a form of sex
discrimination under Title IX finds a parallel in the recent reluctance by some
courts to recognize a school's role in perpetuating peer sexual harassment as sex
discrimination. In both instances, the challenge is to explain why the school's actions
(or failure to take action) discriminated against the harassed students on the basis of sex.
In the end, the same analysis answers this question for both types of harassment.
Whether the underlying conduct is characterized as sexual harassment or anti-gay
harassment, the school discriminates when it condones a form of gender policing that is
so severe or pervasive as to interfere with the ability of harassment victims to receive an
education. Both peer sexual harassment and anti-gay harassment are premised on, and
reinforce, sex-stereotyped views about the proper roles of men and women and
their relation to one another. Adopting an analysis that recognizes sexual
harassment as a form of gender-role policing and sex-stereotyped behavior would
provide a more complete explanation for why the school's role in acquiescing in
the harassment discriminates against students on the basis of sex.
315. As discussed supra Part II, OCR's treatment of at least some forms of peer harassment may no
longer be viable after Oncale.
316. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that employer classification
using sex plus parental status to set job qualifications is sex discrimination under Title VII).
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The policing of gender roles-either by punishing persons perceived as gender
non-conformists, like Anne Hopkins and Jamie Nabozny, or by reinforcing the
boundaries of male-female sex roles through the subordination of females, as in
LaShonda Davis' case-lies at the heart of the conduct that sex discrimination
law should address. The premise of the non-discrimination principle is that
individuals should not have their life opportunities limited because of their sex.
When harassment is used to punish persons who depart from the gender roles
associated with their sex, or to reinforce the distinctions dictated by gender roles,
individuals are very much limited in their opportunities because of their sex. This
linkage between sex, gender roles, and sexual orientation plays out everyday in
classrooms and hallways in federally-funded schools around the country. For the
victims of peer sexual harassment and anti-gay harassment, the educational
impact of non-intervention can be distressingly severe. 3 17 A gender-role policing
model of harassment under Title IX would go a long way toward protecting
students from these consequences.

317. See AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 15-18 (1993); GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION
NETWORK, NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS
AND THEIR EXPERIENCES IN SCHOOL (1999) <http://www.glsen.org/pages/sections/news/natlnews/1999/
sep/survey>.

